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NOTES

Enforcement of TSCA and the Federal Five-Year Statute of
Limitations for Penalty Actions
Teresa A. Holderer
INTRODUCTION

Congress enacted the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976i
(TSCA) to tackle the known and unknown dangers many chemicals
pose to human health. 2 In TSCA, Congress granted the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA or "the Agency") broad authority to promulgate and enforce regulations specifying testing, reporting, and
record keeping requirements for manufacturers and processors of
chemical substances. 3 Congress also granted EPA the power to restrict, regulate, and prohibit the manufacture, handling, processing,
and distribution of substances that present an unreasonable risk of injury to human health or the environment.4 The Agency can bring an
action in federal court for specific enforcement and for seizure of
chemicals manufactured, processed, or distributed in violation of
TSCA, 5 but its primary enforcement tool is the assessment of administrative penalties under section 16 of the Act. 6
Although TSCA prescribes various tools for effective enforcement,
neither the statute nor the regulations contain any statute of limitations specifying how quickly EPA must initiate such enforcement activities. The lack of an express statute of limitations leaves entities
regulated by the Act unable to experience repose and unsure of when
1. Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1988)).
2. See 15 U.S.C. § 2601(a) (1988) (findings of Congress).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2603-2604, 2615 (1988). Section 15 ofTSCA declares that it shall be unlawful for any person to fail to comply with its provisions or any of EPA's regulations, including
reporting and record keeping requirements. It also forbids the use for commercial purposes of
any chemical substance or mixture by a person who has reason to know that the substance was
manufactured, processed, or distributed in violation of any EPA dictates. 15 U.S.C. § 2614
(1988).
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2603-2605 (1988). Probably the best known substances regulated extensively
under TSCA are Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs) and asbestos. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 761.1761.218, 763.60-763.179 (1991).
5. 15 u.s.c. § 2616 (1988).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 2615 (1988). Congress also provided citizens the right to bring actions to
restrain violations or to compel EPA to perform its duties under TSCA. 15 U.S.C. § 2619
(1988). Citizen suits have not been a factor in TSCA enforcement, however, perhaps because of
the public's lack of access to corporate files to detect violations. For an example of a citizen suit
under TSCA, see Pottstown Indus. Complex v. P.T.I. Servs. Inc., No. 91-5660, 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3256 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 1992).
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they can discard voluminous records which they might need someday
in litigation. Further, in the absence of a statute of limitations, BPA
has less incentive to prosecute suspected TSCA violations promptly.
In fact, because penalties can reach $25,000 for each violation, and
each day counts as a separate violation for some violations,7 the
Agency has an incentive to delay enforcement in order to recover
higher penalty amounts.
Many years prior to TSCA, Congress enacted a general five-year
statute of limitations for actions for the enforcement of civil penalties,
fines, and forfeitures, 8 which, if applicable, would alleviate these
problems. Although the Agency claims that no statute of limitations
applies, this Note argues that the general five-year statute of limitations, found in section 2462 of title 28, should apply to BPA's administrative proceedings to assess penalties as well as to later collection
actions in federal courts. Part I details TSCA's enforcement procedures, which create special difficulties when applying section 2462's
statute of limitations. Part I also examines how BPA, industry, and
agency judges have interpreted section 2462 as applied to TSCA enforcement. It concludes by summarizing the considerations that a
court must address when faced with the issue. Part II analyzes general principles of statutory construction, congressional discussions of
section 2462, court decisions in related administrative areas, and general purposes of statutes of limitations. It argues that applying section
2462 to EPA's assessment of penalties as well as to district court proceedings is consistent with established principles and appropriately resolves the issue. Part III asserts that separate five-year periods should
apply to the Agency's assessment of penalties and to collection actions
in federal court. Part III also discusses when each of these actions
should accrue. This Note concludes that applying section 2462 separately to administrative penalty proceedings and to federal court collection actions best promotes the public's interest in enforcing TSCA
while protecting industry's right to be free from stale claims.
I.

TSCA's ENFORCEMENT FRAMEWORK FOR CIVIL PENALTIES
THE GENERAL FIVE-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

AND

To decide whether section 2462 applies to TSCA enforcement, a
court must understand both the Act's enforcement mechanism and the
language of section 2462. Section I.A describes the Act's enforcement
framework for the assessment of penalties. Section I.B examines the
7. 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(l) (1988).
8. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 974 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1988)). The
"Historical and Revision Notes" following 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1988) make clear the section is
based on title 28 U.S.C. § 791 (1940). Further,§ 791 itself"appears to have had its genesis in the
Act of March 2, 1799, 1 Stat. 627, c. 22 .•.." Smith v. United States, 143 F.2d 228, 229 (9th
Cir. 1944); see also United States v. Core Lab., Inc., 759 F.2d 480, 482 (5th Cir. 1985).
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federal statute of limitations for enforcement of penalties and the debate over its application to TSCA. This Part concludes by identifying
the key issues which a court must address to resolve the controversy
regarding section 2462's application to TSCA.
A.

TSCA ~ Enforcement Framework

Courts often describe enforcement of civil penalties under TSCA
as a two-tier process - an administrative penalty assessment and a
collection action in district court.9 Section 16(a) of TSCA provides
that EPA "shall" assess civil penalties for violations of the Act. 10 Unlike under other environmental statutes, the Agency's administrative
action to assess penalties under TSCA is a mandatory prerequisite to
an EPA penalty action in federal court. 11 In this first, mandatory
stage, EPA retains wide discretion in assessing the amount of the penalties and in enforcing payment of the penalty. It must take into account various- factors in assessing the penalty, including the nature,
circumstances, extent, and gravity of the violation, the violator's ability to pay, and the violator's prior compliance record. 12 TSCA does
not, however, require that EPA weigh these factors in any particular
manner. 13 Moreover, the Agency has discretion to modify or compromise any civil penalty assessment with or without conditions. 14
EPA initiates the administrative action under the Act by filing an
administrative complaint. After the violator has had the opportunity
for a hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ) assesses a penalty on
behalf of the Agency by issuing an order. 15 Either the Agency or the
violator can appeal the order to the Environmental Appeals Board. 16
If an alleged violator still believes it has not committed a violation or
9. See, e.g., United States v. N.O.C., Inc., 28 Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1460, 1462-63 (D.N.J.
Oct. 14, 1988); In re 3M Co., No. TSCA-88-H-06, 1989 TSCA LEXIS 8 at *20 (Aug. 7, 1989);
In re Tremco, Inc., No. TSCA-88-H-05, 1989 TSCA LEXIS 13 at *5 (Apr. 7, 1989).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2)(A) (1988).
11. Other environmental statutes permit EPA to choose whether to assess a penalty administratively or to file an immediate action in district court. See, e.g., Clean Water Act (CWA), § 2,
33 U.S.C. §§ 1319, 1321 (1988 & Supp. II 1990); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of
1976 (RCRA), § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (1988)); Clean Air Act, § 4(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (1988 &
Supp. II 1990). Prior to the 1990 amendments, civil penalties could only be imposed by an action
in federal court.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2)(B) (1988).
13. See 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2)(B) (1988). EPA has issued guidelines on how it will weigh
the various factors. Guidelines for the Assessment of Civil Penalties Under § 16 of the Toxic
Substances Control Act, 45 Fed. Reg. 59,770 (1980). In addition, EPA is subject to requirements
of the Administrative Procedures Act; a reviewing court will set aside a decision that is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C.
§ 706 (1988).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2)(C) (1988).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2)(A) (1988).
16. Intra-agency appeals were heard by Chief Judicial Officers until March 1992. See infra
not~ 36-39 and accompanying text.
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that the penalty is excessive following the administrative appeal, it can
contest the Agency's action by appealing to the U.S. Court of Appeals.17 The penalty assessed becomes final if the alleged violator
chooses not to appeal, or upon the Court of Appeal's issuance of its
final judgment. 18 The violator thus becomes obligated to pay the civil
penalty, and interest begins to accumulate. 19 At this point, the violator can gain no further advantage by delaying payment of the penalty,
and therefore, most entities pay the order or judgment without further
action by EPA.20
The second stage of TSCA enforcement takes place only if the violator fails to pay the penalty. The Attorney General will file an action
in district court on behalf of BPA to recover the amount assessed plus
accumulated interest. 21 At this stage, the court cannot review the validity, amount, or appropriateness of the penalty.22 Therefore, the district court action, if one does become necessary, is purely mechanical
and only implements the Agency's enforcement activities. 23
Thus, TSCA enforcement consists of two distinct steps - administrative assessment and collection through a district court. TSCA does
not expressly prescribe a statute of limitations for either stage. As the
next section describes, however, Congress has enacted a general statute of limitations which potentially applies to TSCA enforcement.
B.

The General Five-Year Statute of Limitations and Its Application
to TSCA

Section 2462 of Title 28 contains a general statute of limitations for
actions for the enforcement of civil penalties: "Except as otherwise
provided by Act of Congress, an action, suit or proceeding for the
enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or
otherwise, shall not be entertained unless commenced within five years
from the date when the claim first accrued .... " 24
On its face, section 2462 appears to apply broadly to all proceed17. 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(3) (1988).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(3)-(4) (1988). This assumes the parties do not appeal the decision to
the U.S. Supreme Court.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(4) (1988).
20. As evidence that most violators pay the civil penalty once they can no longer contest its
amount, a LEXIS search conducted on January 27, 1993, revealed only three district court collection actions under TSCA. United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 739 F. Supp. 1030
(E.D.N.C. 1989) (stating that TSCA penalties were only part of a larger dispute), ajfd., 978 F.2d
832 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. N.O.C., Inc., 28 Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1460 (D.N.J. Oct.
14, 1988); United States v. Holloway Oil Co., 28 Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1190 (M.D. Fla. July
26, 1988).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(4) (1988).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(4) (1988).
23. See In re District of Columbia (Lorton Prison Facility), No. TSCA-III-439, 1991 TSCA
LEXIS 12, at *15 (Aug. 30, 1991).
24. 28 u.s.c. § 2462 (1988).

March 1993]

Note -

TSCA Statute of Limitations

1027

ings by the government relating to civil penalties. However, sharp disagreement has arisen between EPA and industry regarding whether
the Agency's administrative penalty assessment proceeding is an "action, suit or proceeding for the enforcement" of a civil penalty. EPA
claims that its penalty assessment action is not such a proceeding, and
thus no statute of limitations applies. It argues that courts must construe section 2462 narrowly because it is a derogation of sovereignty.25
Under a strict construction, only the district court collection stage of
TSCA enforcement is a "proceeding for the enforcement" of a civil
penalty. 26 Industry, on the other hand, takes a more expansive view of
enforcement proceedings and would include EPA's administrative
proceedings under TSCA. 27
EPA also asserts that section 2462's presence in a title of the
United States Code regulating federal courts and the lack of direct legislative history linking section 2462 to administrative proceedings militate against its applicability to the Agency's initial assessment of
TSCA penalties.28 Industry counters that section 2462's codification
in title 28 does not determine its application. It relies on several congressional pronouncements on section 2462's applicability and decisions by courts in other administrative areas to demonstrate that
section 2462 should apply to administrative proceedings under
TSCA. 29
Finally, EPA and industry dispute when a penalty action "accrues." Section 2462 offers no guidance on this issue. The Agency
asserts that an action accrues under TSCA only upon EPA's issuance
of a final order or the Court of Appeal's issuance of a final judgment,
25. See infra text accompanying notes 42-49.
26. E.g., Complainant's Memorandum in Opposition to Respondents' Motion to Dismiss at
9-21, 31-33, In re CWM Chem. Servs., Inc., No. II TSCA-PCB-91-0213, 1991 TSCA LEXIS 21
(Nov. 6, 1991), revd., TSCA Appeal No. 91-6, 1992 WL 90321 (Mar. 23, 1992); EPA's Motion
to Strike Affirmative Defense at 11-13, In re 3M Co., No. TSCA-88-H-06, 1989 TSCA LEXIS 8,
at *20 (Aug. 7, 1989), modified, TSCA Appeal No. 90-3, 1992 TSCA LEXIS 6 (Feb. 28, 1992).
27. E.g., Motion of Bethlehem Steel Corporation to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for an
Accelerated Decision at 11-16, In re Bethlehem Steel Corp., No. TSCA-III-322, 1991 WL
328113 (Dec. 23, 1991), revd., TSCA Appeal No. 92-1, 1992 WL 118,796 (May 12, 1992); Reply
Brief of Respondent, Bethlehem Steel Corporation at 9-15, Bethlehem Steel, TSCA Appeal No.
92-1; Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in Support at 8-9, 16-17, CWM, No. II TSCA-PCB91-0213; Response to Complainant's First Motion to Strike Affirmative Defense at 13-22, 3M,
No. TSCA-88-H-06; Response to Complainant's Reply to Response to Complainant's First Motion to Strike Affirmative Defense at 9-17, 3M, No. TSCA-88-H-06.
28. See Complainant's Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss at
25-31, CWM, No. II TSCA-PCB-91-0213; Complainant's Reply to Response to Complainant's
First Motion to Strike Affirmative Defense at 8-13, 21, 3M, No. TSCA-88-H-06; infra notes 98106 and accompanying text.
29. See Reply Brief of Respondent, Bethlehem Steel Corporation at 60-62, Bethlehem Steel,
TSCA Appeal No. 92-1; Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in Support at 9-11, CWM, No. II
TSCA-PCB-91-0213; Response to Complainant's First Motion to Strike Affirmative Defense at
7-13, 3M, No. TSCA-88-H-06; infra notes 107-08, 114-30 and accompanying text.

1028

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 91:1023

whichever occurs later. 30 Industry believes the action accrues at the
time of the alleged violation.31
Until recently, the issue of section 2462's application to TSCA actions remained unsettled even at the agency level. In 1983, the first
ALJ to face the issue dismissed one count of EPA's administrative
complaint because it related to a violation which had occurred more
than five years before the filing of the administrative complaint.32 The
ALJ accepted, without discussion, the respondent's assertion that section 2462 barred the claim. 33 Almost six years later, in 1989, several
ALJs ruled that no statute of limitations applies to administrative actions to assess penalties under TSCA. 34 In 1991, however, two ALJs
in three separate matters took a different view and decided that section
2462 does apply to administrative actions under the Act. Accordingly, they dismissed claims relating to violations occurring more than
five years before EPA filed its administrative complaint. 35
The Agency resolved its internal controversy the following year.
In In re 3M, 36 the Chief Judicial Officer, formerly EPA's appellate
level, 37 ruled that no statute of limitations applies to administrative
proceedings under TSCA. He concluded that the ALJ had ruled
properly that section 2462 applies only to an action in district court to
recover a penalty, and that the action cannot accrue until the agency
has finally determined the amount. 38 The newly created Environmen30. Complainant's Memorandum in Opposition to Respondents' Motion to Dismiss at 21-25,
CWM, No. II TSCA-PCB-91-0213; EPA's Motion to. Strike Affirmative Defense at 14-15, 3M,
No. TSCA-88-H-06.
31. E.g., Motion of Bethlehem Steel Corporation to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for an
Accelerated Decision at 16-18, Bethlehem Steel. No. TSCA-III-322; Reply Brief of Respondent,
Bethlehem Steel Corporation at 43-59, Bethlehem Steel, TSCA Appeal No. 92-1; Response to
Complainant's First Motion to Strike Affirmative Defense at 22-31, 3M, No. TSCA-88-H-06;
Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in Support at 20-24, CWM, No. II TSCA-PCB-91-0213.
32. In re Commonwealth Edison Co., No. TSCA-V-C-133, 1983 TSCA LEXIS 14 (Dec. 1,
1983).
33. Commonwealth Edison, No. TSCA-V-C-133.
34. In re 3M Co., No. TSCA-88-H-06; In re Rollins Envt. Servs., Inc., No. II-TSCA-PCB88-0116, 1988 TSCA LEXIS 12 (Sept. 28, 1990); In re Energy Sys. Co., No. TSCA-VI-408C
(June 16, 1989); In re Tremco, Inc., No. TSCA-88-H-05, 1989 TSCA LEXIS 13 (Apr. 7, 1989).
Of these, the 3M and Tremco decisions are the more complete, addressing at length the arguments raised by both parties. To underscore the importance which industry and EPA attached
to the issue by 1989, the parties to 3M devoted 124 pages of briefs to discussion of their statute of
limitations arguments.
35. Bethlehem Steel, No. TSCA-111-322; CWM, No. II TSCA-PCB-91-0213; In re District of
Columbia (Lorton Prison Facilify), No. TSCA-III-439, 1991 TSCA LEXIS 12 (Aug. 30, 1991).
Lorton Prison is the counterpoint to 3M and Tremco; after examining at length decisions in other
administrative areas, congressional comments on § 2462, and general policy, the AU reached
the opposite conclusion.
36. In re 3M Co., TSCA Appeal No. 90-3, 1992 TSCA LEXIS 6 (Feb. 28, 1992).
37. Chief Judicial Officers formerly handled all appeals from AU penalty decisions. On
March 1, 1992, they were replaced by the Environmental Appeals Board, which is a three-member panel. 57 Fed. Reg. 5320 (1992) (to be codified in scattered sections of 40 C.F.R.).
38. 3M, TSCA Appeal No. 90-3.
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tal Appeals Board followed 3M and reversed the two ALJs who had
found that section 2462 could bar administrative penalty proceedings. 39 3M appealed its decision to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,40 which will likely rule in 1993.
The D.C. Circuit will confront a two-tier enforcement process with
no express statute of limitations, a federal statute of limitations for
penalty actions located in a judicial code, and doctrines of sovereign
immunity and strict construction. The next Part considers these factors and concludes that section 2462 applies to EPA's assessment of
penalties under TSCA.

II.

SECTION 2462

AND

EPA's AsSESSMENT OF PENALTIES

This Part concentrates on section 2462's application to TSCA's administrative proceedings, because there appears to be a consensus
among courts, EPA, and industry that section 2462 applies to district
court actions to collect penalties. 41 This Part demonstrates that administrative penalty assessments under TSCA are "proceedings for the
enforcement of" a civil penalty and that section 2462's presence in the
judicial code does not preclude its application to EPA proceedings.
Section II.A examines the argument that strict construction should
apply when a party asserts a statute of limitations against the govern39. See In re Bethlehem Steel Corp., TSCA Appeal No. 92-1, 1992 WL 118796 (May 12,
1992); In re CWM Chem. Servs., Inc., TSCA Appeal No. 91-6, 1992 WL 90321 (Mar. 23, 1992).
40. 3M Co. v. EPA, No. 92-1126 (D.C. Cir. filed Mar. 27, 1992). CWMandBethlehem Steel
also filed appeals. CWM Chem. Servs., Inc. v. Reilly, No. 92-1177 (D.C. Cir. filed Apr. 21,
1992), dismissed, No. 92-1177, 1992 WL 390882 (Dec. 10, 1992); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA,
No. 92-1225 (D.C. Cir. filed May 22, 1992), dismissed, No. 92-1225 (Jan. 29, 1993). Of the three,
only 3M is an appeal of a final order. CWM and Bethlehem Steel had argued that because the
statute of limitations issue is dispositive of the outcome of the litigation, the issue should not
await a final order assessing penalties. However, on December 10, the court dismissed the CWM
appeal as not ready for review. CWM, No. 92-1177; see also 16 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1583
(Dec. 18, 1992) (discussing CWM). Following the CWM dismissal, EPA and Bethlehem Steel
filed a joint motion for dismissal of the Bethlehem Steel appeal which the court granted. Bethlehem Steel, No. 92-1225 (Jan. 29, 1993).
41. Although United States Dept. of Labor v. Old Ben Coal Co., 676 F.2d 259 (7th Cir.
1982), provides some support for an argument that § 2462 does not apply to a mere collection
action in district court (see infra notes 124-27 and accompanying text), EPA has not seriously
questioned the application of§ 2462 to district court actions under TSCA. In United States v.
N.O.C., Inc., 28 Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1460, 1464 (D.N.J. Oct. 14, 1988), the court noted that
both parties correctly acknowledged that § 2462 applied to an action to collect a penalty assessed
under TSCA but differed on when the action accrued. See also In re 3M Co., TSCA Appeal No.
90-3, 1992 TSCA LEXIS 6, at *32 (Feb. 28, 1992) (holding§ 2462 inapplicable to administrative
penalty actions as opposed to court proceedings to enforce an administrative penalty); In re
Tremco, Inc., No. TSCA-88-H-05, 1989 TSCA LEXIS 13, at *11 (Apr. 7, 1989) (finding§ 2462
inapplicable to administrative actions but appropriate for district court actions). Indeed, courts
have applied § 2462 to district court proceedings that followed administrative penalty assessments under a variety oflegislative schemes. E.g., United States v. Meyer, 808 F.2d 912 (1st Cir.
1987) and United States v. Core Lab., Inc., 759 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1985) (Export Administration
Act); United States v. McCune, 763 F. Supp. 916 (S.D. Ohio 1989) (Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act); United States v. C & R Trucking Co., 537 F. Supp. 1080 (N.D. W. Va. 1982)
(Clean Water Act).
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ment and concludes that although the government is the plaintiff in
TSCA penalty actions, strict construction of 2462 is not appropriate.
Section II.B argues that even if a court must strictly construe section
2462, EPA's administrative actions under TSCA are proceedings "for
the enforcement of" civil penalties within the meaning of section 2462.
Section II.C rebuts the argument that section 2462's codification in the
judicial code implies a congressional intent to exclude administrative
proceedings from its purview. The section explains that every time a
congressional committee addressed section 2462 in written reports
dealing with administrative proceedings, it stated that section 2462 applies. Although no federal court has directly faced the issue, section
II.D examines cases in which courts have assumed or stated that section 2462 applies to administrative penalty actions. Section II.D concludes that because courts recognize that section 2462 applies to
administrative actions for assessment of penalties in some contexts, its
language requires that it must apply to actions under TSCA unless
Congress explicitly states otherwise. Finally, section II.E asserts that
applying section 2462 only to district court proceedings under TSCA
would defeat the purposes of statutes of limitations.
A. Sovereign Immunity and Strict Construction

Statutes of limitations do not bind the United States unless Congress expressly so provides.42 This common law principle originated
from the English belief that immunity from limitations periods was an
essential prerogative of sovereignty.43 Today, the principle remains viable because it rests on the important policy of preserving public rights
and revenues, vested in the government for the protection of all, from
the carelessness of public officers who fail to take timely action. 44
Congress can, and sometimes does, create a cause of action for the
government without specifying a statute of limitations.45 If a statute
granting the government a cause of action contains no statute of limitations, the courts must examine general statutes of limitations created
by Congress.46 If none of the general statutes of limitations apply, the
42. Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 133 (1938); E.I. Dupont de Nemours
& Co. v. Davis, 264 U.S. 456, 462 (1924); United States v. Whited & Wheless, Ltd., 246 U.S. 552,

561 (1918); United States v. City of Palm Beach Gardens, 635 F.2d 337, 339 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1081 (1981).
43. Guaranty Trust, 304 U.S. at 132; United States v. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis
Ry., 118 U.S. 120, 125 (1886); Palm Beach Gardens, 635 F.2d at 339.
44. Guaranty Trust, 304 U.S. at 132; Palm Beach Gardens, 635 F.2d at 339; United States v.
Weintraub, 613 F.2d 612, 618 (6th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 441 U.S. 905 (1980).
45. Palm Beach Gardens, 635 F.2d at 339.
46. For example, 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1988) provides a general statute of limitations of five
years for fine, penalty, and forfeiture actions. In comparison, 28 U.S.C. § 2415 (1988) requires
the government to bring a tort action within three years and contract or quasi-contract action
within six years.
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government can bring an action at any time.47
As a corollary to governmental immunity, courts accept that statutes of limitations that purportedly apply to the government must be
strictly construed in its favor. 48 This means that courts will read the
statute closely and rigidly and will not broaden the statute's reach by
implication. Further, where a statute is susceptible to more than one
interpretation, courts will choose the reading which favors the govemment. 49 The application of strict construction by courts may seem inappropriate when Congress and state legislatures have largely erased
the government's immunity from statutes of limitations. 50 Indeed,
courts have occasionally construed statutes of limitations broadly to
include the government. 51 Within the past decade, however, the
47. E.g., United States v. Tri-No Enter., 819 F.2d 154, 158-59 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding no
statute of limitations applies to actions to collect reclamation fees under the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act); Palm Beach Gardens, 635 F.2d at 341 (holding no statute of
limitations applies to an action by the United States to recover its share of the sale price of a
hospital built with federal grant money).
48. See Badaracco v. Commissioner, 464 U.S. 386, 391 (1984); E.I. Dupont de Nemours &
Co. v. Davis, 264 U.S. 456, 462 (1924); United States v. Whited & Wheless, Ltd., 246 U.S. 552,
561 (1918); Mullikin v. United States, 952 F.2d 920, 926 (6th Cir. 1991), cert denied, 113 S. Ct.
85 (1992).
49. See, e.g., Dupont, 264 U.S. at 462; Whited & Wheless, 246 U.S. at 561. For a definition of
"strict construction," see BLACK'S LAW DrcnoNARY 1422 (6th ed. 1990); WILLIAM P. STATSKY ET AL., WEST'S LEGAL DESK REFERENCE 208 (1991).
50. See Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REv. 1177, 1252
(1950) (cited with approval in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 467-68 n.14
(1975)). The author argues that "[i]n view of the apparent absence of sound policy ground for
the sovereign exemption, complete repudiation of the rule would seem desirable." Id. at 1253.
One federal judge has argued that the government should not be exempt from limitations periods: "in my judgment, they should sound the horn in other fields and send the hounds to follow
trails which are not so stale, for lex dilationes semper exho"et ('the law abhors delay') is a better
rule than nullum tempus occurrit regi [no lapse of time bars the King]." United States v. Weintraub, 613 F.2d 612, 626 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 905 (1980) (Merritt, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
51. For example, in Unexcelled Chem. Corp. v. United States, 345 U.S. 59 (1953), the
Supreme Court ruled that a statute of limitations which did not explicitly include the government
nevertheless barred the government's action to recover liquidated damages under the WalshHealey Act, ch. 881 § 1, 49 Stat. 2036 (codified as amended at 41 U.S.C. § 35 (1988)), for the
employment of child labor. The Court rejected the government's contention that the statute of
limitations at issue only applied to suits by employees. The Court observed that the statute
applied to " 'any cause of action for unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime compensation, or
liquidated damages, under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, the Walsh-Healey
Act, or the Bacon-Davis Act.' " Unexcelled Chem., 345 U.S. at 61 (quoting Portal-to-Portal Act
of 1947, 61 Stat. 84, 87, (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 255 (1988))). The Co1:1rt then
reasoned that because only the government could bring actions for liquidated damages under the
referenced acts, the statute must, by implication, include the government. Unexcelled Chem., 345
U.S. at 63. A strict construction of the statute would not have permitted such an implication.
The Court further stated that this construction was proper even if it would prejudice the
power of the government to safeguard the public interest. Unexcel/ed Chem., 345 U.S. at 666; see
also United States v. Gary Bridges Logging & Coal Co., 570 F. Supp. 531, 532 (E.D. Tenn. 1983)
(''The government's position that no limitation period applies [to an action to collect mine reclamation fees] is untenable.''). The Gary Bridges court held that either the general six-year limitation for federal contract actions or a limitations period in the Internal Revenue Code for the
collection of excise taxes must apply. Gary Bridges. 510 F. Supp. at 532. Yet the statute of
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Supreme Court has acknowledged the existence of this interpretive
principle favoring the government. s2
But, even if strict construction of statutes of limitations in favor of
the government persists, it should not be invoked when considering
section 2462's application to a governmental penalty action. As a corollary to the principle that statutes of limitations do not apply against
the government unless Congress provides otherwise, strict construction favoring the government should logically not apply when Congress plainly subjects the government to a limiting statute.s 3
Sutherland's treatise on statutory construction supports the distinction
between statutes of limitations like section 2462 that clearly include
the government, and those that. do not: "Where a statute expressly
includes the government there is no room for the operation of the
[strict construction] rule, and a statute of this nature, like any other, is
entitled to receive a sensible and reasonable treatment."s 4
Often when courts have applied strict construction they were examining statutes of limitations that did not expressly include the government. Significantly, the statute of limitations at issue in E.L
Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Davis, ss the leading case cited for the
principle of strict construction, ·did not expressly include the government. The provision construed by the Court provided: "'[a]ll actions
at law by carriers, subject to this Act for recovery of their charges ...
shall be begun within three years .... ' "S 6 Defendants argued that
this provision precluded the government from recovering demurrage
charges that accrued during the period of federal control of the railways. The Court observed that title IV of the Transportation Act,
which contained the statute of limitations, applied to "common carriers. "s7 On the other hand, provisions relating to government control
limitations in the IRC expressly applies only to excise taxes imposed under the IRC, not to those
imposed under other statutes.
52. Badaracco, 464 U.S. at 391 (stating that it "long ago pronounced the standard: 'Statutes
of limitation sought to be applied to bar rights of the Government, must receive a strict construction in favor of the Government.' " (quoting Dupont, 264 U.S. at 462). However, the statute of
limitations which the Court construed in Badaracco explicitly excluded actions of the type before
the Court, and therefore, the principle of strict construction was not necessary to the result.
53. See, e.g., United States v. Weintraub, 613 F.2d 612, 619 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 441
U.S. 905 (1980) ("[A]n exception to that general rule exists when the sovereign (through the
legislature) expressly imposes a limitation period upon itself.").
54. 3 SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 62.02 (4th ed. 1986). In Developments in
the Law: Statutes ofLimitations, supra note 50, at 1190, the author asserts that where the right
involved in the statute may be exercised only by the sovereign, a statute limiting the right will be
construed strictly against the state. The author's blanket assertion must be qualified, as this
notion appears to have been referenced only in actions against taxpayers. E.g., United States v.
Updike, 281 U.S. 489, 496 (1930). While Unexcelled Chem., 345 U.S. 59, see discussion supra
note 51, may be analyzed on this basis, the Supreme Court never stated that it intended to con·
strue the statute strictly against the government.
55. 264 U.S. 456, 460 (1924).
56. 264 U.S. at 459 (quoting Transportation Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 459, 491-92).
57. 264 U.S. at 460-61 (referring to§ 400 of Transportation Act, 41 Stat. at 474).
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of the railways were contained in a separate section of the Transportation Act. 58 Because the Act separated provisions relating to the government from those governing other carriers, the Court held that the
United States was not a carrier within the meaning of the statute and
therefore could recover demurrage charges accruing more than three
years prior to the action. s9 In contrast to Title IV of the Transportation Act, section 2462 applies primarily to the government and therefore should not be strictly construed. 60
The remaining category .of cases that invoke strict construction involves attempts by defendants to recharacterize the government's
cause of action in order to fit within a general statute of limitations. 61
These cases likewise do not dictate application of strict construction to
section 2462 for a penalty action. In United States v. Whited & Wheless, Ltd., 62 the defendant asked the Supreme Court to bar an action
based on a six-year statute of limitations for bringing actions to vacate
government grants of public land. The Court held that the limitations
period did not apply to the action by the government to recover the
value of the land as damages for deceit and fraud by the defendant in
procuring the grant. 63 Because the government did not bring a cause
of action to vacate the grant, the limitations period could not apply.
This case can be distinguished from cases that involve causes of action
that clearly fit within the statute of limitations. It therefore does not
require strict construction of section 2462 for a penalty action.
Similarly, in United States v. City of Palm Beach Gardens, 64 the
defendant sought to characterize the government's cause of action
either as a contract action barred by the general fec,leral statute of limitations for contract claims65 or as an action to recover money diverted
from a grant program barred by a limitation contained in the federal
grant program. The Fifth Circuit characterized the government's action as an action to recover its share of the sale price of a hospital built
with federal grant money, and therefore neither statute of limitations
cited by the defendant could apply. 66 Again, the government's cause
58. 264 U.S. at 461 (referring to title II of Transportation Act).
59. 264 U.S. at 459-60.
60. See infra note 94.
61. See, e.g., United States v. Whited & Wheless, Ltd., 246 U.S. 552 (1918); United States v.
City of Palm Beach Gardens, 635 F.2d 337 (5th Cir.), cerL denied, 454 U.S. 1081 (1981); United
States v. Fire Ring Fuels, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 326 (E.D. Ky. 1991); United States v. Hawk Contracting, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Pa. 1985); United States v. Davio, 136 F. Supp. 423 (E.D.
Mich. 1955).
62. 246 U.S. 552, 560 (1918).
63. 246 U.S. at 563.
64. 635 F.2d 337, 341 (5th Cir. 1981).
65. 28 u.s.c. § 2415 (1988).
66. Palm Beach Gardens, 635 F.2d at 341.
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of action did not clearly fit within the statute of limitations in the way
that penalty actions fit within section 2462.
Courts construing section 2462 have generally adopted this reasoning which limits use of strict construction to cases in which defendants
attempt to recharacterize an action to fit within a statute of limitations. 67 Most courts faced with a clear penalty action do not even
mention the principle of strict construction. 68 Mullikin v. United
States 69 represents a rare federal case in which the court applied strict
construction of section 2462 to a penalty action.
Mullikin, however, is clearly distinguishable from a penalty action
under TSCA. Mullikin involved an action by the IRS under section
6701 of the Internal Revenue Code70 to recover penalties assessed
against an accountant who fraudulently prepared a client's tax returns.
The court observed that section 2462 does not apply if Congress provides otherwise. 71 Because the Internal Revenue Code expressly contains a statute of limitations, the court found that Congress had
"otherwise provided." 72 Because the statute of limitations contained
in the code could have covered actions under section 6701, but did not
expressly, no statute of limitations applied to the government's action. 73 The court also found that Congress intended that no statute
limit actions under section 6701, which was designed to give the IRS
substantial latitude to combat fraud by third-party advisers. 74 In contrast, TSCA does not contain a statute of limitations, and there is no
evidence that Congress intended no limitations period to apply to actions under the Act. 1s
67. See, e.g., United States v. Hawk Contracting, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (finding that an action to collect mine reclamation fees, which is a fee under the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 on each ton of coal produced, is not a fine or penalty
subject to § 2462's limitation); United States v. Davio, 136 F. Supp. 423 (E.D. Mich. 1955)
(holding that action by government to recover amount which subcontractors paid as kickbacks to
obtain the subcontracts was not a penal sanction because the amount of kickback equaled the
amount by which the government had been damaged). Both Davio and Hawk Contracting actually refer to the principle of strict construction. See also United States v. Fire Ring Fuels, Inc.,
788 F. Supp. 326 (E.D. Ky. 1991) (reaching the same result as Hawk Contracting without reference to the principle); United States v. Weaver, 207 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1953) (finding without
explicit reference to the principle that an action to recover money from defendants for their
allegedly obtaining property by fraudulent means is compensatory in nature and not an action for
a civil penalty and therefore § 2462 could not bar the action).
68. See, e.g., United States v. Meyer, 808 F.2d 912 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Core
Lab., Inc., 759 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1985); H.P. Lambert Co. v. Secretary of the Treasury, 354 F.2d
819 (1st Cir. 1965).
69. 952 F.2d 920 (6th Cir. 1991), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 85 (1992).
70. I.R.C. § 6701 (1988).
71. Mullikin, 952 F.2d at 929.
72. 952 F.2d at 929.
73. 952 F.2d at 929.
74. 952 F.2d at 928.
75. The mere fact that TSCA contains no statute of limitations is not evidence that Congress
intended that none apply. The Clean Water Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,
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Finally, from its language, Congress apparently intended section
2462 to constitute a broad waiver of the government's right to be free
from the operation of statutes of limitations. Section 2462 declares,
"[e]xcept as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, an action, suit or
proceeding ... shall not be entertained . . . ." 76 Such a waiver of
government immunity applies across the board, and the principle of
strict construction should be rendered inapplicable.77 The First Circuit's decision in H.P. Lambert Co. v. Secretary of the Treasury18 supports this position. In H.P. Lambert, the Secretary of the Treasury
ordered the forfeiture of a customhouse broker's license due to the
broker's misconduct over a thirteen-year period. The broker claimed
that section 2462 barred the Secretary from basing forfeiture on misconduct occurring more than five years before commencement of the
forfeiture proceeding. The First Circuit agreed with the broker, finding that language in the relevant statute that " '[t]he collector ... may
at any time, for good and sufficient reasons, serve notice in writing
upon any customhouse broker' " could not prevent section 2462's application to the forfeiture action. 79 Although the First Circuit admitted that the phrase "at any time," if taken literally, might suggest that
no time limit applied, it concluded that "the general policy of statutes
of limitations is so deeply ingrained in our legal system that a period of
limitations made generally applicable to such proceedings, as is section
2462, is not to be avoided unless that purpose is made manifestly
clear." 80
Thus, Dupont, Whited & Wheless, City of Palm Beach, and Mullikin, the key cases that potentially support a strict construction of secand the Clean Air Act (prior to the 1990 amendments) contain no statute of limitations, yet
courts routinely apply § 2462 to them. See infra note 94 and accompanying text. Moreover,
Congress specifically designed § 2462 to cover penalty actions arising under statutes which do
not contain statutes of limitations. See infra text accompanying notes 96-97.
76. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1988) (emphasis added).
77. See H.P. Lambert Co. v. Secretary of the Treasury, 354 F.2d 819 (1st Cir. 1965); United
States v. N.O.C., Inc., 28 Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1460, 1464 n.6 (D.N.J. Oct. 14, 1988) ("The
use of limiting statutes against the state is disfavored by courts because it derogates the sovereign
function. But since Congress itself has stated that section 2462 applies, absent a contrary legislative command, to the enforcement 'of any civil ... penalty,' the court must apply section 2462."
(citations omitted)). The Fifth Circuit, in United States v. P/B STCO 213, ON 527 979, 756
F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1985), rejected the government's contention that no statute of limitations
applied to an action under the Clean Water Act to recover cleanup costs because the CWA
contained no statute of limitations. The court acknowledged that the CWA contains no limitations period, but it found that "Congress has enacted a general statute of limitations, however,
and it is applicable across-the-board to all actions brought by the United States if they are
'founded upon any contract express or implied in law or fact' (six years) or 'founded upon a tort'
(three years)." P/B STCO, 756 F.2d at 368 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2415 (1982)). The court
neither mentioned nor applied strict construction and found that an action to recover cleanup
costs is most like an action based on quasi-contract, thus the general six-year statute of limitations contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a) (1982) governed. P/B STCO, 756 F.2d at 370.
78. 354 F.2d 819 (1st Cir. 1965).
79. H.P. Lambert, 354 F.2d at 822 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1641(b) (1964)).
80. 354 F.2d at 822.
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tion 2462, do not require such an interpretation in TSCA proceedings.
Unlike the statute at issue in Dupont, section 2462 clearly applies to
the government. Unlike the situations in Whited & Wheless and City
of Palm Beach, the government's cause of action under TSCA is a
penalty action, the type covered by the statute of limitations. Finally,
TSCA, unlike the tax code analyzed in Mullikin, does not contain any
statute of limitations, yet there is no evidence that Congress intended
that none apply. Moreover, Congress broadly waived the government's immunity from limitation periods for penalty actions when it
enacted section 2462. This broad waiver should obviate application of
strict construction to section 2462.

B. EPA Proceedings Under TSCA and a Strict Construction of
Section 2462
Absent strict construction, EPA's administrative assessment of
penalties under TSCA easily falls within the language of section 2462
as an action "for the enforcement of [a] civil ... penalty." 81 ALJs
who found section 2462 inapplicable to TSCA had applied strict construction, while those who held that section 2462 barred administrative complaints issued more than five years after the violation found
strict construction inappropriate. 82 This section asserts that even a
strict construction of enforcement should include administrative assessments of penalties under TSCA.
The Agency claims that only the district court collection action
constitutes an action for the enforcement of a civil penalty. 83 It argues
that the administrative proceeding is not one which "enforces" a penalty; it merely assesses one. If the defendant refuses to pay, EPA must
file a district court action. Thus the district court, not the Agency,
compels payment. 84 EPA further argues that a penalty cannot be "enforced" in the first instance until one has been assessed. 85
These arguments ignore the common understanding of enforcement and the reality of EPA's primary role in TSCA enforcement.
Black's Law Dictionary defines enforcement as "[t]he act of putting
something such as a law into effect; the execution of a law; the carrying out of a mandate or command. " 86 EPA's assessment of penalties
81. 28 u.s.c. § 2462 (1988).
82. Compare In re 3M Co., No. TSCA-88-H-06, 1989 TSCA LEXIS 8 (Aug. 7, 1989), modified, TSCA Appeal No. 90-3, 1992 TSCA LEXIS 6 (Feb. 28, 1992) and In re Tremco, Inc., No.
TSCA-88-H-05, 1989 TSCA LEXIS 13 (Apr. 7, 1989) with In re CWM Chem. Servs., Inc., No.
II TSCA-PCB-91-0213, 1991 TSCA LEXIS 21 (Nov. 6, 1991), revd., TSCA Appeal No. 91-6,
1992 WL 90321 (Mar. 23, 1992) and In re District of Columbia (Lorton Prison Facility), No.
TSCA-III-439, 1991 TSCA LEXIS 12 (Aug. 30, 1991).
83. See, e.g., 3M, No. TSCA-88-H-06, at *19.
84. 3M, No. TSCA-88-H-06, at *21.
85. 3M, No. TSCA-88-H-06, at *20.
86. BLACK'S LAW DicrIONARY 528 (6th ed. 1990); see also In re 3M Co., TSCA Appeal No.
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under TSCA fits this definition. 87 Upon discovery of a violation and
further investigation, a penalty is put into effect at the administrative
level. Once the assessment becomes final, the violator generally pays
it. 88 For the vast majority of TSCA violators, then, EPA's administrative proceedings constitute the only enforcement activities they encounter. Moreover, the district court cannot review the amount,
validity, or appropriateness of the penalty; it only executes EPA's action. 89 Thus, the administrative level carries out most, and in some
cases all, of the steps necessary to put a penalty "into effect."
Legislative history reveals that Congress considers EPA's assessment of penalties under TSCA to be an enforcement proceeding. The
Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works stated in connection with the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act:
The bill authorizes the Administrator to issue administrative penalty orders. The government should have the flexibility to enforce the Act administratively, in addition to its powers to enforce the Act in court.
Administrative enforcement authority is provided in numerous other environmental statutes; it often affords a more expeditious and less costly
means for resolving compliance problems. See, the Clean Water Act; the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act; and the Toxic Substances
Control Act. 90

The Conference Committee on the 1990 amendments also endorsed
the view that EPA's activities constitute enforcement actions when it
issued the Joint Explanatory Statement. It stated, "EPA is authorized
to initiate a range of enforcement actions for a number of violations of
specified sections and titles of the Act. Included is authority to issue
administrative penalty orders ...." 91 Consistent with these reports,
EPA's authority to assess penalties administratively under the Clean
Air Act appears under the section of the statute entitled "Federal enforcement. "92 The congressional reports on the Clean Air Act amendments indicate that administrative assessment of penalties serves the
90-3, 1992 TSCA LEXIS 6 (Feb. 28, 1992) (quoting definition of "enforce" from same source);

Lorton Prison, No. TSCA-111-439, at *14 (quoting 5th ed.).
87. See supra text accompanying notes 9-~3. Including administrative action within the definition of enforcement is not novel. The introductory note of the Third Restatement of Foreign
Relations Low states, "[e]nforcement is often carried out through executive or administrative
rather than judicial action; enforcement is thus not merely an aspect of adjudication .•.."
REsrATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 230 (introductory note to pt. IV) (1987).
The Restatement goes on to define '~urisdiction to enforce" as "to induce or compel compliance
or to punish noncompliance with its laws or regulations, whether through the courts or by use of
executive, administrative, police, or other nonjudicial action." Id. § 40l(c).
88. See supra note 20.
89. 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(4) (1988).
90. S. REP. No. 228, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. 364 (1989) (citations omitted) (emphasis added),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3867, 3879.
91. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 952, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 347 (1990) (emphasis added), reprinted
in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3867, 3879.
92. 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
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same enforcement purpose as, and is just an alternative enforcement
procedure to, an action in federal court. 93 Because courts have uniformly construed section 2462 to govern district court actions to assess
penalties under the other environmental statutes, 94 courts should consider TSCA administrative actions to be "enforcement" actions as
well.
If an administrative proceeding under TSCA constitutes "an action, suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine," the language of section 2462 requires that it apply to TSCA.95
Administrative proceedings under TSCA must be subject to section
2462 unless Congress explicitly states that they are not. Because Congress has not done so, section 2462 must govern administrative assessment of penalties under TSCA.
Moreover, section 2462's language manifests Congress' intent that
section 2462 apply to statutes such as TSCA that contain no statute of
limitations. As a district court recently noted, the language of section
2462 "strongly implies that the Congress intended Section 2462 to apply precisely to actions ... in which the substantive right of action
under which the United States sues does not contain an express limitations period." 96 The court stated that it would be absurd to say section 2462 does not apply because the substantive act does not say that
it does. By its language, section 2462 establishes a default mechanism
93. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
94. See United States v. Central Soya, Inc., 697 F.2d 165, 169 (7th Cir. 1982) (Rivers nnd
Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. § 412 (1988)); United States v. Hobbs, 736 F. Supp. 1406, 1408-09 (E.D.
Va. 1990) (Clean Water Act); United States v. Sharon Steel Corp., 30 Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA)
1778, 1780 (N.D. Ohio July 12, 1989) ("It is well established that actions for civil penalties under
the CWA are governed by the five-year federal statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2462."); United
States v. SCM Corp., 667 F. Supp. 1110, 1123 (D. Md. 1987) (Clean Air Act); United States v. C
& R Trucking Co., 537 F. Supp. 1080, 1083 (N.D. W. Va. 1982) (CWA).
Section 2462 was enacted to limit governmental actions to enforce penalties, but courts uniformly apply § 2462 to citizen suits under the CWA rather than borrowing state statutes of
limitations in order to be consistent with EPA enforcement. See, e.g., Public Interest Research
Group v. Powell Dulfryn Terminals Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 74-75 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 1018 (1991) (overruling a long line of District of New Jersey cases holding that no statute of
limitations applied to citizen suits under the CWA); Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 834
F.2d 1517, 1521 (9th Cir. 1987); National Wildlife'Fedn. v. Consumers Power Co., 657 F. Supp.
989, 1010 (W.D. Mich. 1987), revd. on other grounds, 862 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1988); Sierra Club
v. Simkins Indus., 617 F. Supp. 1120, 1125 (D. Md. 1985), affd., 847 F.2d 1109 (4th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 491 U.S. 904 (1989); Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 608 F.
Supp. 440, 447-50 (D. Md. 1985). The Ninth Circuit applied § 2462 to citizen suits because
§ 2462 "clearly applies to enforcement actions brought by the EPA" and applying it to citizen
suits "promotes the important federal policy of uniformity and adequately enforcing Clean
Water Act." Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 834 F.2d at 1521. Likewise, the Chesapeake
court noted, "[p]roceedings initiated by the EPA would almost certainly be subject to a five-year
statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2462, and the limitations period for citizens should not be
shorter." Chesapeake Bay Found., 608 F. Supp. at 448; see also infra note 133 (listing administrative actions in which § 2462 was applied).
95. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
96. United States v. Incorporated Village of Island Park, 791 F. Supp. 354, 368 (E.D.N.Y.
1992).
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that can only apply to actions such as TSCA which do not contain
statutes of limitations.97

C. Section 2462's Codification in Title 28
EPA frequently argues that section 2462's codification in title 28
precludes its application to purely administrative proceedings.98 Title
28, sometimes referred to as the Judicial Code, 99 contains seven
lengthy parts dealing mainly with the judiciary and judicial procedure.
The Agency cites sections 451, 1355, and 2461(a) of title 28 as evidence that Congress intended section 2462 to refer only to proceedings
in federal courts.100
Section 451 appears in a chapter entitled "General Provisions Applicable to Courts and Judges" found in part I of title 28, which is
entitled "Organization of Courts." 101 The section provides the definition of "court of the United States." 102 EPA correctly notes that the
definition of court in this chapter about courts does not include administrative tribunals. However, this fact does not clarify section 2462's
construction. Section 2462 appears in part VI of title 28 entitled "particular proceedings," in a chapter entitled "Fines, Penalties, and Forfeitures." Section 2462 does not even contain the word "court" as
defined in section 451. Instead it refers to "action[s], suit[s], or proceeding[s]," which logically could include administrative proceedings.
If title 28 lacked any reference to administrative proceedings, the
argument that Congress only meant proceedings in federal courts
might be more persuasive. However, title 28 does contain references
to administrative proceedings. Chapter 157 of the title governs Interstate Commerce Commission orders and chapter 158 deals with orders
of other federal agencies. These chapters demonstrate that Congress
did not totally exclude administrative proceedings from the "judicial
title." If Congress intended to limit section 2462 to actions in federal
courts, it easily could have drafted the statute that way instead of using the broad language that it did. 103
97. See Island Park, 191 F. Supp. at 367.
98. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
99. E.g., Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 112 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 n.l (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment); Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. MCorp Fin., Inc., 112 S.
Ct. 459, 463 (1991); Commissioner, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 155 n.l (1990).
100. Complainant's Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss at 27,
In re CWM Chem. Servs., Inc., No II TSCA-PCB-91-0213, 1991 TSCA LEXIS 21 (Nov. 6,
1991); Motion to Strike Affirmative Defense at 12, In re 3M Co., No. TSCA-88-H-06, 1989
TSCA LEXIS 8 (Aug. 7, 1989) (interlocutory order).
101. 28 u.s.c. § 451 (1988).
102. 28 u.s.c. § 451 (1988).
103. See Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242, 2246 (1992) ("Congress' decision to use the
broader phrase 'applicable nonbankruptcy law' in § 54l(c)(2) [of the Bankruptcy Code, 11
U.S.C. § 54l(c)(2) (1988)] strongly suggests that it did not intend to restrict the provision" to
include only state law.); United States v. Smith, 111 S. Ct. 1180, 1189 (1991) ("We must con-
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Section 2461(a), the second section cited by EPA, provides:
"Whenever a civil fine, penalty or pecuniary forfeiture is prescribed for
the violation of an Act of Congress without specifying the mode of
recovery or enforcement thereof, it may be recovered in a civil action." 104 EPA argues that this provision, which immediately precedes
section 2462, indicates that Congress intended section 2462 to apply
only to federal court actions. Section 2461(a), however, cannot control section 2462's construction for TSCA enforcement because TSCA
does specify the mode of enforcement and recovery. It provides EPA
with primary enforcement responsibility and· the ability to bring an
action in district court for recovery of the penalty. Further, no direct
evidence exists that section 2461(a) was intended to restrict section
2462. It is illogical to argue that Congress intended section 2461(a) to
limit section 2462 because section 2462 by its language covers all federal punitive actions, not just those for which Congress did not specify
the mode of recovery or enforcement.
Finally, EPA points to section 1355, which provides that district
courts have original jurisdiction over any action or proceeding for the
recovery or enforcement of any fine, penalty, or forfeiture, exclusive of
the courts of the states. 105 Nothing in title 28 links this provision with
section 2462. Section 1355 appears in a chapter entitled "District
Courts; Jurisdiction" in part IV of title 28; the chapter deals only with
jurisdiction and venue of federal courts. This provision has two main
functions. First, it partially defines the jurisdiction of the district
courts as required by Article III of the Constitution. 106 It also states
that federal courts, not state courts, have jurisdiction to hear penalty
actions arising under federal laws. This section does not say that an
administrative proceeding cannot be considered a proceeding for the
enforcement of a civil penalty under section 2462.
Unfortunately, direct legislative history surrounding section 2462
sheds no light on whether Congress intended to include administrative
proceedings within section 2462. Indirect history, however, implies
that Congress did not intend to preclude section 2462's application to
administrative proceedings. Since 1948, several congressional committees have stated that section 2462 applies to administrative actions
to assess penalties. For example, the Senate Report which accompanied the bill that extended the Export Administration Act (BAA) and
elude that if Congress had intended to limit the protection under the [Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(l)] to employees not
covered under the pre-Act statutes, it would have said as much."); Hamilton v. 1st Source Bank,
928 F.2d 86, 87-88 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that statute of limitations for claims of age discrimination did not run from discovery because if Congress had intended a discovery rule, it could
have written one); supra text accompanying note 73.
104. 28 U.S.C. § 2461(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
105. 28 u.s.c. § 1355 (1988).
106. U.S. CONST. art. III.
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provided for the imposition of civil penalties by the Department of
Commerce stated:
This bill does not prescribe any period following an offense within which
the civil penalty must be imposed. It is intended that the general 5-year
limitation imposed by section 2462 of title 28 shall govern. Under that
section, the time is reckoned from the commission of the act giving rise
to the liability, and not from the time of imposition of the penalty, and it
is applicable to administrative as well as judicial proceedings. 107

Twenty years later when Congress again extended the EAA, the conference report confirmed the application of section 2462 to the Commerce Department's administrative proceedings. 108
Congressional declarations regarding the application of section
2462 to administrative penalty actions under export controls facilitate
an understanding of section 2462's application to TSCA because the
enforcement framework under the EAA substantially resembles that
under TSCA. Under both statutory schemes, administrative assessment of penalties serves as a mandatory prerequisite to an action in
federal court. 109 Although the Supreme Court has stated that subsequent legislative observations do not form part of the legislative history and the intent of the enacting Congress governs, 110 they should
carry significant weight in the absence of direct evidence of legislative
intent. 111 The reports demonstrate at a minimum that Congress did
not intend to preclude absolutely the application of section 2462 to
administrative proceedings.
The recent amendments to the Clean Air Act also demonstrate a
107. S. REP. No. 363, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1965), repn"nted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1826,
1832. The House report accompanying the amendment contains a similar statement. See H.R.
REP. No. 434, 89th Cong., .1st Sess. 5 (1965).
108. H.R. REP. No. 180, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 64, (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N.
108, 126. "The intent of the committee of conference is that the Commerce Department must
bring its administrative case within 5 years from the date the violation occurred." Id.
109. See SO U.S.C. app. § 2410 (1988). The acts differ in that following an administrative
finding, the Export Administration Act requires the district court to determine de novo all issues
ofliability. If the administrative proceeding under export controls can be viewed as an "enforcement" action when the district court reevaluates the matter, surely EPA's final assessment of
penalties under TSCA can be viewed as a proceeding for the enforcement of a civil penalty.
110. Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 758 (1979) (citing United Air Lines, Inc. v.
McMann, 434 U.S. 192, 200 n.7 (1977) and Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 354 n.39
(1977)). In Oscar Mayer, respondent unsuccessfully attempted to override "clear and convincing" evidence of the enacting Congress' intended meaning with a later committee report.
111. Importantly, the Oscar Mayer Court did not state that subsequent committee reports
are irrelevant. 441 U.S. at 758. Indeed, the Court subsequently recognized the value ofpostenactment congressional pronouncements in the absence of other evidence of congressional intent.
Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., 446 U.S. 657, 666 n.8 (1980) ("[W]hile arguments predicated upon
subsequent congressional actions must be weighed with extreme care, they should not be rejected
out of hand as a source that a court may consider in the search for legislative intent."); Seatrain
Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S. 572, 596 (1980) ("[W]hile the views of subsequent
Congresses cannot override the unmistakable intent of the enacting one, such views are entitled
to significant weight, and particularly so when the precise intent of the enacting Congress is
obscure.") (citations omitted).
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congressional intent not to preclude administrative proceedings from
section 2462's time bar. EPA's new authority to issue civil penalties
under the Clean Air Act is expressly made subject to section 2462 by
statute. 112 Yet, extensive reports accompanying the Amendments to
the Clean Air Act do not mention the insertion of section 2462 in the
statutory language. 113 The lack of explanation and the fact that the
reference to section 2462 in the statute is made parenthetically may
indicate that Congress believed section 2462 would apply to EPA administrative actions under the Clean Air Act without additional congressional action. Congress presumably inserted the reference to
section 2462 for clarification purposes. If true, this is further evidence
that Congress does not distinguish administrative proceedings from
court actions for application of section 2462.

D. Federal Courts and Section 2462's Application to Administrative
Penalty Actions

Although no federal court has squarely addressed the issue of
whether section 2462 applies to administrative assessment of penalties,
several courts have stated or assumed that it does. 114 In an unreported
decision, United States v. N.O.C., Inc., 115 the District Court of New
Jersey addressed the issue of when the district court action under
TSCA accrues for purposes of section 2462. The court believed section 2462 must apply separately to each prong of TSCA enforcement.
Applying section 2462 to EPA's penalty action protected the defendant from stale claims and curbed the potential for agency abuse. On
the other hand, the court reasoned, applying section 2462 separately to
the district court collection phase and holding that the action accrues
upon the completion of the administrative process ensures that the
Agency has ample time to collect the penalty it has assessed. 116
112. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. II 1990). This section provides in part:
At any time after the expiration of 30 days following the date on which such notice of a
violation is issued, the Administrator may, without regard to the period of violation (subject
to section 2462 of Title 28) ... (B) issue an administrative penalty order in accordance with
subsection (d) of this section, or (C) bring a civil action in accordance with subsection (b) of
this section.
113. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 952, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3867; S. REP. No. 228, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385.
114. E.g., United States v. Meyer, 808 F.2d 912, 914 & n.2 (1st Cir. 1987); Caldwell v. Gurley Ref. Co., 755 F.2d 645, 651 (8th Cir. 1985); United States Dept. of Labor v. Old Ben Coal
Co., 676 F.2d 259, 261 (7th Cir. 1982); Lancashire Shipping Co. v. Durning, 98 F.2d 751, 752-53
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 635 (1938); United States v. N.O.C., Inc., 28 Envt. Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 1460, 1467-68 (D.N.J. Oct. 14, 1988); see also United States v. McCune, 763 F. Supp.
916, 918 (S.D. Ohio 1989) (stating that defendant made no argument that the Secretary unreasonably delayed administrative proceedings and therefore action is brought within the time
period).
115. 28 Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1460 (D.N.J. Oct. 14, 1988). See supra note 41 and infra
notes 191-93 and accompanying text.
116. N.O.C., 28 Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1467-68.
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Two court of appeals decisions involving the Export Administration Act (EAA) support the N. 0. C. court's analysis. As discussed earlier, 117 the EAA, like TSCA, contains a mandatory administrative
penalty assessment step followed by an optional proceeding in district
court. In both United States v. Core Laboratories, Inc. 118 and United
States v. Meyer, 119 the courts had to decide when section 2462 begins
to run for district court actions to recover penalties assessed administratively under the EAA. Both courts recognized that section 2462
applied to the prior administrative action. In Meyer, the court stated,
"[b]oth parties concede that, as applied to the EAA, this statute at
least requires that any administrative action aimed at imposing a civil
penalty must be brought within five years of the alleged violation." 120
The First Circuit's statements in Meyer cannot be dismissed as
mere dicta. First, the court characterized the question before it as
whether section 2462 provides an additional five years to enforce a
penalty in district court. 121 The Department of Commerce began the
administrative action within three and a half years of the violation. By
the time the administrative process had ended, more than six years
had passed since the violation. Assuming section 2462 applied to the
administrative prong, the court believed it would be incongruous for
Congress to have allowed the government five years to file an administrative penalty action, while permitting the time to expire before the
government could realize the benefits of the administrative proceedings by recovering the penalty in a district court action. 122 The court
also noted that because requiring initiation of the administrative penalty action within five years of the violation abundantly satisfies legitimate concerns for repose, fair notice, and preservation of evidence, its
holding that the district court action accrues at the conclusion of the
administrative prong causes no injustice to the defendants. 123
Similarly, the court in United States Department of Labor v. Old
Ben Coal Co. 124 seemed to assume that section 2462 applies to administrative penalty actions when reaching a decision on whether section
2462 barred a district court action to recover a penalty assessed by the
117. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
118. 759 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1985).
119. 808 F.2d 912 (1st Cir. 1987).
120. Meyer, 808 F.2d at 914. The court expounded, "[a]lthough the analytical underpinnings of this interpretation seem somewhat wobbly, the view is eminently reasonable as a matter
of policy and is supported by two distinct pronouncements of subsequent legislative committees
that chose to comment on the matter." 808 F.2d at 914. In a footnote, the court noted that the
parties' interpretation found substantial support in an earlier decision of the Second Circuit. 808
F.2d at 914 n.2 (referring to Lancashire Shipping Co. v. Durning, 98 F.2d 751 (2d Cir.), cert
denied, 305 U.S. 635 (1938)).
121. Meyer, 808 F.2d at 914.
122. 808 F.2d at 920.
123. 808 F.2d at 922.
124. 676 F.2d 259 (7th Cir. 1982).
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Secretary of Labor under the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety
Act of 1969. 125 The court held that section 2462 did not apply to the
Department of Labor's effort to recover a penalty, which was akin to a
collection action. 126 In reaching its conclusion, the court noted that
the defendant did not need the protection of a limitations period for
the district court action because the administrative penalty action,
which had commenced within five years of the violation, had already
fulfilled the purposes behind the statute of limitations. 127
In yet another context, a court suggested, without deciding, that
section 2462 may apply to administrative assessment of penalties. In
Caldwell v. Gurley Refining Co., 128 a lessor brought an action against a
lessee for a declaratory judgment to determine their respective rights
and obligations vis-a-vis liability to EPA under the Clean Water
Act. 129 The lessee claimed that section 2462 barred the government
from bringing an action against the lessor, and therefore no controversy existed on which the district court could base jurisdiction to hear
the matter. The Eighth Circuit responded that because the Coast
Guard had already commenced substantial administrative penalty
proceedings within five years of the violation, the government still
could prevail. 130 The court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the
lessee was responsible for any liability to EPA. 131
In contrast to these decisions which suggest that section 2462 applies to administrative decisions under a variety of statutes, no federal
court has ever said that section 2462 does not apply to administrativ~
proceedings. 132 Moreover, Alls within EPA have ruled that section
2462 applies to administrative penalty assessments under other environmental statutes such as the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA). 133 Under RCRA, EPA can choose whether to file an
immediate action in· district court or to assess a penalty administra125. Pub. L. 91-173, tit. I, § 109(a)(4), 83 Stat. 742, 756 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C.
§ 820(j) (1988 & Supp. II 1990)).
126. Old Ben Coal, 676 F.2d at 261. The court stated that even if§ 2462 did apply to the
district court action, the action could not accrue until the administrative proceeding ended because no cause of action exists unless a violator refuses to pay.
127. 676 F.2d at 261.
128. 755 F.2d 645 (8th Cir. 1985).
129. 33 u.s.c. § 1321 (1988).
130. Caldwell, 155 F.2d at 651.
131. 755 F.2d at 648. The district court awarded EPA $76,758.60 for cleanup costs. United
States v. Gurley Ref. Co., 788 F. Supp. 1473, 1478-79 (E.D. Ark. 1992).
132. In Mullikin, the government specifically raised the issue of whether an administrative
penalty assessment constitutes an action for the enforcement of a penalty under § 2462. However, because the court held that Congress did not intend § 2462 to apply to actions under§ 6701
of the IRC, the court declined to reach the issue. Mullikin v. United States, 952 F.2d 920, 929-30
n.17 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 85 (1992).
133. 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (1988). E.g., In re Waterville Indus., No. RCRA-I-87-1086, 1988
RCRA LEXIS 20 (June 23, 1988); see also In re J.V. Peters & Co., RCRA Appeal No. 88-3,
1990 RCRA LEXIS 25 (Aug. 7, 1990). The CJO decided the case on different grounds, but
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tively, 134 but once the Agency decides to proceed administratively, the
procedures are nearly identical to those under TSCA. 135 Because both
the administrative procedures and guiding principles between RCRA
and TSCA are similar, the language of section 2462 cannot support a
distinction between them. If EPA's administrative penalty assessment
under RCRA fits within the definition of a proceeding for the enforcement of a civil penalty, so should its action under TSCA. 136 Thus,
EPA actions under TSCA should be subject to section 2462's bar.
E.

TSCA Administrative Proceedings, Section 2462, and Purposes of
Statutes of Limitations

Just as the language of section 2462 requires its application to
EPA's assessment of penalties, 137 so do its purposes. Statutes of limitations such as section 2462 serve three overlapping functions: (1) to
ensure fairness and repose to defendants; (2) to promote the effectiveness and efficiency of the judicial system; and (3) to promote societal
stability.13s Applying section 2462 only to district court proceedings
does not advance these purposes.139
Ensuring fairness to the defendant ranks highest among the various purposes of statutes of limitations. 140 The Supreme Court long
noted in a footnote that applying § 2462 to administrative penalty actions would be consistent
with Clean Water Act and Clean Air Act enforcement.
134. See supra note 11.
135. See 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a) (1988).
136. In In re Tremco, Inc., No. TSCA-88-H-05, 1989 TSCA LEXIS 13 (Apr. 7, 1989), an
AU explained why he holds that § 2462 does not apply to TSCA when he had previously held
that§ 2462 does apply to RCRA. Under RCRA, EPA has a choice of proceeding administratively to assess a penalty or filing an immediate action in district court and § 2462 clearly applies
to a RCRA action in federal court. Therefore, the AU reasoned, § 2462 also should apply to
administrative penalty assessments, presumably to prevent EPA from choosing a forum based on
the statute of limitations issue. However, the language of § 2462 cannot support this distinction
based on policy.
137. See discussion supra section 11.B.
138. Carie G. McKinney, Note, Statute of Limitations for Citizen Suits Under the Clean
Water Act, 72 CoRNELL L. REv. 195, 202 (1986); see also, e.g., Gretchen W. Anderson, Unifonnity in Clean Water Act Enforcement: Applying a Five Year Federal Statute ofLimitations to
Citizen Suits, 6 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 49, 70-71 (1987); M. Patrick McDowell, Note,
Limitations Period for Federal Causes of Action After the Judicial Improvement Acts of 1990, 44
,VAND. L. REv. 1355, 1367 (1992); Neil Sobol, Comment, Detennining Limitation Periods for
Actions Arising Under Federal Statutes, 41 Sw. L.J. 895, 897-98 (1987).
139. See United States Dept. of Labor v. Old Ben Coal Co., 676 F.2d 259, 261 (7th Cir. 1982)
(recognizing that the administrative- proceedings under the federal coal mine health and safety
statute, not the district court proceedings, fulfill the purposes of putting the alleged violator on
notice and preventing the loss of evidence); see also United States v. Meyer, 808 F.2d 912, 922
(1st Cir. 1987) ("All in all, construing§ 2462 to require the initiation of administrative proceedings [under the EAA] within five years of the date of the alleged violation ..• abundantly satisfies
any legitimate concerns for repose, fair notice, and preservation of evidence.").
140. United States v. Meyer, 808 F.2d 912, 921 (1st Cir. 1987) (noting that the primary
purpose of statutes of limitations is to prevent unjust surprise through the revival of claims long
after evidence has been lost and memories have faded); Sobol, supra note 138, at 897.
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ago stated:
Statutes of limitations ... in their conclusive effects are designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that
have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories
have faded, and witnesses have disappeared. The theory is that even if
one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to
defend within the period of limitations and that the right to be free of
stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them. 141

More recently, the Court, relying in part on the above case, declared
that "[s]tatutes of limitations ... represent a pervasive legislative judgment that it is unjust to fail to put the adversary on notice to defend
within a specified period of time ...." 142 Further, the Senate report
concerning the enactment of section 2415, a general statute of limitations for government contract and tort actions, contains a supporting
statement by the Comptroller General expressing the belief that "as a
matter of fairness, persons dealing with the Government should have
some protection against an action by the Government when the act
occurred many years previously." 143 Section 2462, like section 2415,
protects entities from government delay.
These Supreme Court and legislative pronouncements embody
three separate fairness concerns: repose, notice, and preservation of
evidence needed for defense. The concern for repose signifies that at
some point, the defendant should have a right, absent fraud or other
special circumstances, to be free from stale claims. 144 To accomplish
repose, a statute of limitations provides a definite time within which
rights must be asserted. But without an application of section 2462 to
the administrative action, an alleged violator could never enjoy repose.
EPA would have unlimited power to delay bringing penalty actions
even for decades after -.:he alleged violation. "An interpretation of a
statute purporting to set a definite limitation upon the time of bringing
action . . . which would nevertheless, leave defendant subject indefinitely to action for the wrong done, would . . . defeat its obvious
purpose." 145
Thus, courts should not interpret section 2462 to exclude EPA ad141. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944);

see also Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 352 (1983); United States v. Kubrick,
444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979).
142. Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 117 (1979) (emphasis added).
143. S. REP. No. 1328, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. 7 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2502,
2508.
144. United States v. Core Labs., Inc., 759 F.2d 480, 483 (5th Cir. 1985).
145. Reading Co. v. Koons, 271 U.S. 58, 65 (1926). In Reading, the Court construed§ 6 of
the Federal Employers Liability Act, ch. 149, 35 Stat. 66 (1908) (codified as amended at 45
U.S.C. § 56 (1988)), which provided that no action could be maintained unless commenced
within two years from the day the cause of action accrued. The plaintiff insisted that the limitation period ran not from the death of the victim but from the appointment of the estate administrator. The Court rejected the argument because the plaintiff could put off applying for the
appointment of the administrator and consequently decide when the statute runs. The Court

March 1993]

Note -

TSCA Statute of Limitations

1047

ministrative actions, which would result in no definite time limit
within which actions must begin. If section 2462 does not require
BPA to file its administrative complaint within five years, the violator
must look endlessly over its shoulder, waiting for the threatened action to begin, yet ignorant of the extent of its ultimate liability. The
uncertainty of liability over an extended period of time may cause it to
invest cautiously in its operations, leading to operational inefficiencies
and eventual noncompetitiveness. Application of section 2462 prevents BPA from dangling liability over a defendant, chilling its
actions. 146
Sometimes an entity does not know that it has violated TSCA.
The concern with repose, therefore, does not even come into play.
However, in this case, statutes of limitations prevent unnecessary loss
to defendants by forcing the agency to act when it learns of the violation, providing notice to the defendant. The defendant can then minimize any harm caused by its actions. In re CWM Chemical Services,
Jnc. 147 best illustrates this point. CWM alleged that as early as 1981
or 1982, EPA knew the composition of certain sludge CWM was receiving for disposal at its facility. The Agency obtained its information from the entity which produced the sludge, and therefore its
information may have been superior to that of CWM. Yet, EPA
waited until March 1991 to file an administrative complaint against
CWM for improper disposal and then sought over seven million dollars in penalties. 148 If true, this is a prime example of unjust surprise
to the defendant's and the public's detriment. If BPA had initiated a
claim against CWM in 1982, CWM may have been able to correct the
problem and avoid massive liability.
While BPNs concern for public health and its reputation may provide some incentive for the Agency to act even in the absence of a
statute of limitations, CWM demonstrates that agency inertia sometimes can be more powerful. Further, without section 2462, TSCA
provides a built-in incentive for BPA to delay notifying the violator.
TSCA provides that for continuing violations each day counts as a
separate violation; as each day passes, the defendant could be liable for
up to an additional $25,000. 149 The defendant need not even know of

recognized that permitting the plaintiff to control events occurring prior to the running of the
statute of limitations defeats its purposes. Reading, 271 U.S. at 65.
146. United States v. N.O.C., Inc., 28 Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1460, 1467 (D.N.J. Oct. 14,
1988).
147. No. II TSCA-PCB-91-0213, 1991 TSCA LEXIS 21 (Nov. 6, 1991), revd., TSCA Appeal
No. 91-6, 1992 WL 90321 (Mar. 23, 1992).
148. Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in Support at 23, CWM, No. II TSCA-PCB-910213.
149. 15 U.S.C. § 2615{a)(l) {1988).
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the violation. 150 Thus, permitting EPA to bring actions at any time
can lead to astronomical liability even for an entity that did not realize
it had committed a violation. The potential for agency abuse under
TSCA was a key factor in the N. 0. C. court's decision that section
2462 applies separately to the administrative enforcement step. The
court agreed with the defendant that the potential for abuse "must be
checked by a stem application of limiting statutes."151
Finally, fairness to the defendant encompasses the ability to obtain
or preserve evidence needed for its defense. 152 No one doubts that
claims become more difficult to defend with the passage of time. 153
This is especially true in the corporate context. Not only does one
encounter the usual problems of faded memories and the unavailability of documents, but in the era of corporate cutbacks and early retirements, many witnesses are no longer employed by the defendant. 154
Most employees no longer stay with one employer for their entire career.155 With the passage of time, "best known addresses" retained by
personnel departments may prove unreliable for former employees
who are not receiving pension benefits, and fewer of the employees
who were familiar with the events giving rise to the violation are easily
accessible to the defendant. As employees leave, many documents,
which constitute the corporate memory, become lost or destroyed. 15 6
Yet, historic efforts to comply with TSCA, compliance policies, and
the inadvertence of a violation are all relevant to penalty determinations.157 Without a time limit on EPA, the defendant will have greater
difficulty proving these potential mitigating factors. In other cases, a
150. If an entity knowingly violates TSCA, it is subject to criminal prosecution. 15 U.S.C.
§ 2615(b) (1988).
151. N.O.C, 28 Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1467.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 140-41.
153. See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979); supra text accompanying notes
140-41; infra text accompanying notes 160-64.
154. See e.g., John Burgess, IBM Plans More Job Cuts, Calls Its First Layoffs Likely, WASH.
Posr, Dec. 16, 1992, at Al, A9 (reporting that IBM will cut back 25,000 jobs in 1993 and bring
its staffing down to 275,000 from a peak of 400,000 in 1985); Laura Fowlie, Inefficient Operations
Force Big 3 to Rebuild Engines, FIN. POST, Dec. 26, 1992 (stating that new GM CEO's job will
be to cut another 30,000 or so employees, mainly through early retirement and attrition); John
Holusha, Dupont Sets A Charge of $5 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1993, at C4 (reporting
$275,000 million charge for plant closings and early retirement).
155. Labor Secretary Lynn Martin hailed a new unemployment benefit law which became
effective January l, 1993, stating, "Because •.• most workers will change careers many times in
their lives, pensions that follow workers from job to job and from company to company will add
to the flexibility and competitiveness of each individual worker." Martin Says Employees Will Be
Helped by Provisions of Unemployment Benefits Law, 19 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 1269 (July 13, 1992);
Another Take on Corporate Layoffs and Staff Loyalty, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Sept. 24, 1992
(Executive Update; Your Employees), at 1 (quoting Peter Drucker as saying that massive layoffs
by corporations have "ended middle-management loyalty if there ever was any").
156. For a discu5sion of these problems, see In re District of Columbia (Lorton Prison Facility), No. TSCA-III-439, 1991 TSCA LEXIS 12, at *32 (Aug. 30, 1991).
157. See In re 3M, Co., TSCA Appeal No. 90-3, 1992 TSCA LEXIS 6, at *9-25 (Feb. 28,
1992).

March 1993]

Note -

TSCA Statute of Limitations

1049

defendant may have records dating back several decades without the
availability of witnesses to explain apparent inconsistencies.
Potential prejudice to the defendant resulting from these factors
becomes particularly pronounced in the administrative arena where
the same agency serves as both prosecutor and judge. As one AU
commented, "exposure to the same field of regulation inevitably results in the development of a point of view which, unconsciously or
otherwise, influences the initial decision and, in some cases, the conduct of the hearing." 158 Although Congress and administrative agencies have taken steps to improve the independence of ALls, their
efforts have not achieved total success.1 5 9
BPA may suffer some of the same consequences of delay as defendants. Certainly, the Agency experiences personnel changes and may
lose certain records. However, BPA decides which cases to prosecute.
While preparing for prosecution, it may concentrate its attention on
information it needs and neglect to retain other information which
could be useful to the defendant. Once BPA finally issues its administrative complaint, the defendant, not the Agency, will be called upon
to explain discrepancies in the records.
The lack of reliable witnesses and documents also frustrates the
second purpose of statutes of limitations - promotion of the effectiveness and efficiency of the judicial system. In United States v.
Kubrick, 160 the Court recognized that statutes of limitations "protect
defendants and the courts from having to deal with cases in which the
search for truth may be seriously impaired by the loss of evidence,
whether by death or disappearance of witnesses, fading memories, disappearance of documents, or otherwise." 161 Fresh testimony ensures
more reliable factfinding and enhances the efficiency, accuracy, and
effectiveness of the judicial system. 162 Stale claims cannot easily be
presented or adjudicated. 163 This has led the Supreme Court to declare: "Statutes of limitations are not simply technicalities. On the
158. Paul N. Pfeiffer, Hearing Cases Before Several Agencies - Odyssey of an Administrative
Law Judge, 21 ADMIN. L. REv. 217, 221 (1975).
159. Karen Y. Kauper, Note, Protecting the Independence of Administrative Law Judges: A
Model Administrative Law Judge Corps Statute, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 537, 537 (1985) ("At the
federal level, each ALJ serves one agency, hearing cases arising under that agency alone. This
close association of ALJs with administrative agencies may lead to agency proceedings that are
neither objective nor well reasoned."); L. Hope O'Keefe, Note, Administrative Law Judges, Per-

formance Evaluation, and Production Standards: Judicial Independence Versus Employee Accountability, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 591, 612 (1986) (noting that although ALJs are
independent of prosecutorial staffs, the number of ALJs, staffs, workloads, vacations, and geographic assignments are within agency control). Kauper further asserts that corrective measures
adopted by Congress, such as performance evaluations by an independent agency, have not
achieved the goal of ALJ independence. Kauper, supra, at 537-38.
160. 444 U.S. 111 (1979).
161. Kubrick. 444 U.S. at 117 (emphasis added).
162. Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 487 (1980).
163. S. REP. No. 1328, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2502,
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contrary, they have long been respected as fundamental to a well-ordered judicial system." 164 Applying section 2462 to TSCA administrative proceedings promotes adjudicative accuracy and efficiency by
ensuring that defendant's liability and the appropriateness of the penalty are determined before the evidence becomes stale.
In TSCA enforcement, problems caused by stale evidence would
fall most heavily on the administrative proceeding because at the district court level EPA only has to prove that it assessed a certain penalty and that the defendant refused to pay it. Nevertheless, whether
section 2462 applies still affects the federal courts because prior to the
district court proceeding, the defendant can appeal as of right to the
court of appeals. 165 The court of appeals would then also have to
struggle with the lack of fresh testimony. Requiring EPA to begin its
proceedings within section 2462's time limit avoids this problem.
Finally, statutes of limitation promote societal stability. Third parties may be reluctant to deal with companies that face the uncertainty
of unsettled claims. 166 This is particularly true when the amount of
the claim can escalate for years. Statutes of limitations require that
adverse parties tackle and resolve a dispute or unsettled claim within a
reasonable period of time so that entities can devote their energy to
their primary business.
Statutes of limitations enhance fairness, judicial effectiveness, and
societal stability. As the Court has repeatedly declared: "[a] federal
cause of action 'brought at any distance of time' would be 'utterly repugnant to the genius of our laws.' " 167 Courts must apply section
2462 to administrative actions assessing penalties in order to fulfill the
purposes of statutes of limitations.
III.

ACCRUAL OF SECTION 2462 WHEN APPLIED TO TSCA

This Part explains how courts should apply section 2462 to TSCA.
As a court decides how section 2462 applies to one of TSCA's enforcement steps, it also should examine whether section 2462 applies to the
other prong, and if so, when the action accrues. Deciding how section
2462 applies by looking only at the district court proceeding could
leave the defendant with effectively no protection from ancient claims
by permitting EPA to control events which begin the running of the
2503 (recommending passage of§ 2415, a statute of limitations applying to government contract
and tort actions).
164. Tomanio, 446 U.S. at 487.
165. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
166. McKinney, supra note 138, at 202-03; see supra text accompanying notes 144-45.
167. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 271 (1985) (quoting Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 336, 342 (1805)); see also Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S.
143, 156 (1987) (quoting Wilson in response to Justice Scalia's dissent which asserted that since
RICO contained no statute of limitations, none applied).
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statute. On the other hand, focusing on the administrative phase
could permit the defendant to exhaust the time period with administrative appeals and leave the agency with inadequate time in which to
bring a collection action.
Several solutions to the problem are possible under section 2462.
The administrative enforcement prong could accrue either upon violation or upon its discovery by EPA. As section 2462 is applied to the
district court prong, 168 it could accrue upon violation, discovery, or
upon final assessment of the penalty by EPA or the court of appeals.
Section III.A argues that EPA must file its administrative complaint
within five years of the violation. Section IIl.B asserts that the district
court action should not accrue until final administrative assessment of
penalties, provided section 2462 applies to the administrative stage as
well. Thus, the Agency would have five years to file a district court
collection action after the penalty assessment becomes final.

A. Accrual of the Administrative Action
In the context of TSCA enforcement, the administrative proceedings determine the extent of a violator's liability for civil penalties. 169
With few exceptions, when referring to actions that determine the extent of defendant's liability for penalties or forfeiture, courts and Congress have interpreted section 2462 and its predecessors to run from
the date of violation, not from the time of its discovery. 170 The precedent holding that section 2462 runs from violation is so overwhelming
that in 1985, when deciding when a district court collection ~ction
should accrue, the Fifth Circuit felt compelled to hold that it too accrues at violation. 171 It believed that the date of violation had received
universal acceptance as the date when a claim accrued under section
2462, citing no less than sixteen cases for this proposition.172
Following this pervasive trend, courts generally have held that section 2462 runs from the date of the violation in the environmental
168. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 10-23 and accompanying text.
170. E.g., United States v. Athlone Indus., 746 F.2d 977, 982 n.l (3d Cir. 1984); Western
Pac. Fisheries, Inc. v. S.S. President Grant, 730 F.2d 1280, 1287 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Ancorp Natl. Servs., 516 F.2d 198, 200 n.5 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Witherspoon, 211
F.2d 858, 861 (6th Cir. 1954); The Ng Ka Py Cases, 24 F.2d 772, 774 (9th Cir. 1928) (under 28
U.S.C. § 791, the predecessor to§ 2462); United States v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 518 F.
Supp 1021, 1037 (N.D. Ohio 1981); FTC v. Lukens Steel Co., 454 F. Supp. 1182, 1185 n.2
(D.D.C. 1978); United States v. Appling, 239 F. Supp. 185, 194-95 (S.D. Tex. 1965); United
States v. Fraser, 156 F. Supp. 144, 147 (D. Mont. 1957), affd., 261 F.2d 282 (9th Cir. 1958);
United States v. One Dark Bay Horse, 130 F. 240, 241 (D. Vt. 1904) (applying Revised Statutes
§ 1047); see supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text. But see infra notes 177-79 and accompanying text.
171. United States v. Core Lab., Inc., 759 F.2d 480, 482 (5th Cir. 1985).
172. Core Lab., 759 F.2d at 482. Reliance on these cases was misplaced, however, as explained infra notes 198-201 and accompanying text.
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context as well. As mentioned above, 173 under other environmental
statutes, BPA can choose whether to file an action in district court
directly or to assess the penalty administratively. Regardless of which
route it chooses to follow to impose penalties, EPA still must file its
administrative or civil complaint within five years of the violation to
ensure success. This is true for RCRA, 174 the Clean Air Act,m and
for the majority of courts that have heard penalty actions under the
Clean Water Act (CWA).176
A few courts have deviated from this rule in cases involving permit
violations under the CWA. When courts routinely began to apply section 2462 to citizen suits under the CWA, a minority of courts believed
it would be unfair to require citizens to begin an action within five
years of the violation, given their lack of access to the violator's facility. Until the alleged violator files a discharge monitoring report
which reveals the violation, the public would have great difficulty discovering it. Therefore, these courts held that citizens can begin actions within five years of the filing of the report. 177 Nevertheless, even
in this situation most courts start the running of the statute from the
date of violation. 178 In United States v. Hobbs, 179 the court followed
the minority approach of the citizen-suit cases and held that the stat173. See supra notes 11, 133 and accompanying text.
174. In re Waterville Indus., No. RCRA-I-87-1086, 1988 RCRA LEXIS 20, at *9 (June 23,
1988); see also United States v. Hardage, 116 F.R.D. 460 (W.D. Okla. 1987):
At the present time, this Court is not satisfied the Government may bring an action under
CERCLA or RCRA without regard to the timeliness . . . . The Court cannot accept such a
view [that the government's cause of action exists ad infinitum] and therefore declines at this
time to strike Defendant's statute of limitations defense.
116 F.R.D. at 467.
175. See supra note ll2 and accompanying text; United States v. SCM Corp., 667 F. Supp.
1110 (D. Md. 1987).
176. United States v. Sharon Steel Corp., 30 Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1778, 1780 (N.D. Ohio
July 12, 1989) ("It is well established that actions for civil penalties under the CWA are governed
by the five-year federal statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2462.") (citations omitted); see, e.g.,
United States v. C. & R. Trucking Co., 537 F. Supp. 1080 (N.D. W. Va. 1982).
177. E.g., Public Interest Research Group v. Powell Dulfryn Terminals Inc., 913 F.2d 64 (3d
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1018 (1991) (overruling a long line of District of New Jersey
cases holding that no statute of limitations applied to citizen suits under the CWA); Northwest
Envtl. Defense Ctr. v. Unified Sewerage Agency, 30 Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1117 (D. Or. 1989);
Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Al Tech. Specialty Steel Corp., 635 F. Supp. 284 (N.D.N.Y.
1986).
178. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 834 F.2d 1517, 1523 (9th Cir. 1987)
(discussing the district court rulings); Lykins v. Westinghouse Elec., 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 21,498, 21,501 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 29, 1988); National Wildlife Fedn. v. Consumers Power Co.,
657 F. Supp. 989 (W.D. Mich. 1987), revd. on other grounds, 862 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1988);
Connecticut Fund for the Envt. v. Job Plating Co., 623 F. Supp. 207, 212-13 (D. Conn. 1985);
Sierra Club v. Simkins Indus., 617 F. Supp. 1120 (D. Md. 1985), ajfd., 847 F.2d 1109, 1124-25
(4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 904 (1989); Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 608 F. Supp. 440 (D. Md. 1985); Friends of the Earth v. Facet Enters., 618 F. Supp. 532,
535-36 (W.D.N.Y. 1984).
179. 736 F. Supp. 1406 (E.D. Va. 1990), ajfd, 947 F.2d 941 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112
s. Ct. 2274 (1992).
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ute of limitations for government actions under the CWA runs from
the filing of the discharge monitoring report.
Courts should not follow the Hobbs analysis, however, for the reasoning developed in the citizen-suit context is not applicable to EPA
actions. Unlike private citizens, the Agency has access to entities' facilities. It has broad authority under environmental statutes to conduct inspections, check records, and request additional information. 180
While EPA's resources are limited, five years should be ample time to
discover permit violations. Further, because Congress charged the
Agency with responsibility to ensure compliance with environmental
statutes, defendants should not suffer because of the Agency's inaction. Finally, if courts condone a lack of diligence by EPA, it may not
perform diligently. 181 The Agency would have less incentive to inspect or investigate facilities in a timely manner if it can impose a
penalty regardless of timing.
No basis exists for distinguishing penalties assessed under TSCA
from those assessed under other environmental statutes. In fact, the
Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works stated that Congress modeled the recent amendments to the Clean Air Act enforcement framework "after similar provisions in other environmental
statutes, including the Toxic Substances Control Act." 182 In TSCA,
as in other environmental statutes, Congress provided EPA with all
the weapons at its disposal to enable it to discover violations in a
timely fashion. 183 Permitting EPA to delay enforcement until five
years after it happens to discover a violation only encourages inaction
and additional delays. If EPA diligently performs its responsibilities
under TSCA but cannot discover the violation because an entity actively conceals it, equitable tolling would protect EPA's cause of
action. 184
Because discovery of the violation ultimately rests in EPA's hands,
allowing the action to accrue upon discovery can result effectively in
no statute of limitations. The evils that such a policy can cause al180. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1318(a)(B), 1319(g)(l0), 1369(a) (1988); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 7414(a),
7607(a) (Supp. II 1990); infra note 183.
181. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
182. S. REP. No. 228, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 361 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3385, 3744.
183. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2610 (1988) (power to inspect and to issue subpoenas).
184. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396-97 (1946); In re District of Columbia (Lorton Prison Facility), No. TSCA-III-439, 1991 TSCA LEXIS 12, at *32 (Aug. 30, 1991). The
AU in Lorton stated:
[I]n response to any argument that a respondent may wrongfully conceal violations of
TSCA and thus allow the five year limitation to expire, the equitable doctrine of fraudulent
concealment which is read into every statute of limitations could be applied to toll the statute in cases where the required elements of fraudulent concealment are present.
No. TSCA-IIl-439 at *32 (footnote omitted).
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ready have been demonstrated. 185 Starting the running of the limitations period upon discovery would especially compromise the
defendant's ability to obtain evidence needed for a proper defense.
The majority of record retention requirements under TSCA are five
years or less. 186 Thus, initiation of an action only one day past five
years places the defendant at a disadvantage. If the defendant destroys records in accordance with statutory retention requirements, it
no longer has documents it needs for its defense.
No corresponding benefit from delay outweighs the potential injustice. The public could achieve satisfaction knowing a violator ultimately has been punished and may benefit from the deterrent effect of
indeterminate liability. The Supreme Court has admonished, however, "[i]n compelling circumstances, even wrongdoers are entitled to
assume that their sins may be forgotten." 187 Further, the public receives greater benefit from efficient and prompt enforcement of TSCA.
The longer EPA delays taking action against entities that improperly
use, store, or dispose of toxic substances or fail to disclose risks, the
longer the public will be exposed to the risks represented by such improper practices. Both the public and the alleged violator benefit
when EPA is required to begin an enforcement action within a specific
time after the violation occurs.
In sum, overwhelming authority urges that the administrative action should accrue upon violation. 188 No corresponding policy justifies deviating from this authority. Congress intended that EPA "carry
out [TSCA] in a reasonable and prudent manner."189 Five years provides EPA with a broad period for enforcement while not unduly burdening industry. 190
185. See supra notes 139·67 and accompanying text.
186. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 704.11 (1992) (3 years); 40 C.F.R. § 704.25(f) (1992) (5 years); 40
C.F.R. § 704.33(g) (1992) (5 years); 40 C.F.R. § 704.95(f) (1992) (5 years); 40 C.F.R.
§ 704.104(g)(l) (1992) (3 years); 40 C.F.R. § 710.37 (1992) (4 years); 40 C.F.R. § 720.78(a), (b)
(1992) (5 years); 40 C.F.R. § 721.40 (1992) (5 years); 40 C.F.R. § 721.125 (1992) (5 years); 40
C.F.R. § 761.ISO(c), (e) (1992) (5 years); 40 C.F.R. § 761.209 (1992) (3 years). But cf. 40 C.F.R.
§§ 717.15(d), 761.180(a),(b),(d),(f), 763.94 (1992) (imposing longer periods for certain records
relating to PCBs and asbestos).
187. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 271 (1985).
188. Some violations, such as a failure to do something which TSCA requires, can be charac·
terized as continuing violations. For these violations, each day counts as a separate violation for
which the violator can be subject to additional penalties. 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(I) (1988). One
ALJ held that this section only refers to the amount of penalties and not to when the statute
runs, and barred all violations beginning more than five years before the complaint even though
the violations allegedly continued into the five-year period. In re Bethlehem Steel Corp., No.
TSCA-111-322, 1991 WL 328113, at *2-3 (Dec. 23, 1991), revd., TSCA Appeal No. 92-1, 1992
WL 118796 (May 12, 1992) (holding general statute of limitations does not apply to TSCA
administrative penalty proceedings). Section 2462, however, should bar only those days of viola·
tions occurring outside the five-year period in cases of actual continuing violations.
189. 15 U.S.C. § 2601(c) (1988).
190. See Anderson, supra note 138, at 71.
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B. Accrual of the District Court Action
The final issue to be resolved is when the district court action accrues, thus starting the second five-year clock. Theoretically, several
possibilities exist: upon violation or discovery, with or without tolling
during the administrative process, or upon the completion of the administrative process. The best-reasoned court decisions provide that if
an administrative proceeding is a mandatory prerequisite to the district court action, and the agency must file the administrative complaint within five years of the violation, the district court action does
not accrue until the administrative procedure is complete.
In United States v. N.O.C., Inc., 191 the only federal court to decide
when the district court action accrues under TSCA held that it accrues
upon completion of the administrative process. The court found that
an action accrues from the last act necessary to give a party a cause of
action. Under TSCA, this occurs when a penalty has been finally assessed and all appeals are exhausted. Until EPA has imposed a penalty it has nothing to recover in district court. 192 The court was
particularly concerned that if the clock began running from the time
of violation, the period could expire even before the administrative action ended. It found nothing "within the context of [TSCA] actions
which would prompt it to ... adopt a rule which prevents collection of
[TSCA] penalties by virtue of the length of the proceeding necessary to
assess them." 193
The N. 0. C. court relied heavily on the Supreme Court's decision in
Crown Coat Front Co. v. United States. 194 Crown Coat involved a suit
by a government contractor contesting the government's rejection of
an adjustment under the "changes clause" of the contract. The government contract required parties to submit disputes to a contracting
officer with appeal to the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals,
and to "exhaust these procedures before filing an action in federal court.
The Court held that the action accrued at the end of the administrative process; until then, the plaintiff had no right to file a district court
action. 19 5 When an action accrues must be " 'interpreted in the light
of the general purposes of the statute and of its other provisions, and
with due regard to those practi~al ends which are to be served by any
191. United States v. N.O.C., Inc., 28 Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1460 (D.N.J. Oct. 14, 1988).
192. N.0.C., 28 Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1467-68.
193. 28 Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1467. In N.O.C., EPA filed an administrative complaint
within a year of the violation and assessed a penalty two years later. However, appeals by the
defendant to the CJO, Third Circuit, and the Supreme COurt consumed another three and onehalf years. EPA gave N.O.C. another year in which to pay the penalty after the conclusion of the
appeals. By this time, seven years had passed since the violation.
As noted above, theN.O.C. decision rests on§ 2462's application to the administrative tier as
well. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
194. 386 U.S. 503 (1967).
195. Crown Coat, 386 U.S. at 511-12.
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limitation of the time within which an action must be brought.' " 196
Allowing the limitation period to run from completion of the contract
would have an unfortunate impact, the Court noted. The administrative procedure could be so protracted that the plaintiff could lose the
right before he had it. 197 Therefore, the action must run from the conclusion of the administrative proceedings. As noted above, this is the
same concern that motivated the N. 0. C. court.
Under the analogous Export Administration Act, two courts of appeals reached conflicting conclusions on when the district court action
accrues for purposes of section 2462. The Fifth Circuit in Core Laboratories 198 felt compelled by precedent to find that the district court
proceeding accrued upon violation. However, the cases on which it
relied involved statutes which contained no mandatory administrative
step like the EAA and TSCA. 19 9 The cases cited by the court had held
that the initial action which assesses or imposes penalties or forfeitures
must begin within five years of the violation. 200 The First Circuit recognized this shortcoming in United States v. Meyer. 201 The Meyer
court found that logic, the plain language of section 2462, and considerations of fairness prevented it from following the Core Laboratories
result. First, like the Crown Coat and N. 0. C. courts, the Meyer court
believed the district court action cannot possibly accrue until an enforceable administrative penalty exists. 202 The court noted that the
use of the word " 'enforcement' in 28 U.S.C. § 2462 is not without
significance; ... [it] presupposes a penalty to be enforced."203 The
Core Laboratories interpretation could require the government to file
an action in federal court before a final penalty had been assessed.
Further, the Meyer court found that fairness to the government
required that the statute of limitations for the district court action begin running only at the end of the administrative proceedings. 204 Once
the government begins administrative proceedings, the timing of that
process is largely beyond the Agency's control. If the defendant
delayed administrative proceedings, the government could lose its
right to recover the penalty in district court through no fault of its
own even before it had a right to file. 205 The court believed Congress
196. 386 U.S. at 517 (quoting Reading Co. v. Koons, 271 U.S. 58, 62 (1926).
197. 386 U.S. at 514.
198. United States v. Core Lab., Inc., 759 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1985).
199. Core Lab., 759 F.2d at 482; see United States v. Meyer, 808 F.2d 912, 916 (1st Cir.
1987).
200. See supra notes 170-72 and accompanying text; see also Unexcelled Chem. Corp. v.
United States, 345 U.S. 59 (1953) (construing Portal-to-Portal Act, not§ 2462).
201. 808 F.2d 912, 916 (1st Cir. 1987).
202. Meyer, 808 F.2d at 914.
203. 808 F.2d at 915.
204. 808 F.2d at 919.
205. 808 F.2d at 915, 919. The court relied extensively on the Supreme Court's reasoning in
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would not have allowed the government five years to file an administrative action but failed to provide it time to realize the benefits of the
administrative proceedings. 206 Several subsequent courts, including
the N. 0. C court, have adopted. the Meyer rationale ~hen applying
section 2462 to district court actions; 207 no court has followed Core
Laboratories.
One earlier district court decision under the CWA is relevant to
this inquiry. In United States v. C & R Trucking Co., 208 the court held
that an action in district court accrued on the date of the oil spill even
though a penalty had been first assessed administratively. Courts
should not follow this decision in the context of TSCA enforcement.
First, the C & R Trucking court did not even address the concern that
the limitations period could expire before administrative proceedings
are exhausted. This concern alone prevented the Crown Coat, Meyer,
and N. 0. C courts from allowing the action to accrue prior to the completion of the administrative process. Second, the enforcement provision construed by the court in C & R Trucking concerned oil spills.
BPA learns of an oil spill when it occurs - no real time is lost before
discovery. In contrast, many TSCA violations involve record keeping
or reporting violations which may take longer to detect, or conditions
that EPA can only discover upon inspection. To prevent TSCA enforcement from becoming a nullity, the Agency must have the ability
to bring an action in district court if it becomes necessary.
Tolling the five-year period during the administrative proceedings,
as opposed to starting a separate five-year period, would also preserve
indefinitely the Agency's ability to bring an action in district court.
Crown Coat Front Co. v. United States, 386 U.S. 503 (1967). See supra notes 194-97 and accompanying text. The Meyer court also drew on United States Dept. of Labor v. Old Ben Coal Co.,
676 F.2d 259 (7th Cir. 1982), in which the court held that even if§ 2462 applied, the cause of
action could not accrue until the administrative proceeding ended, the penalty was assessed, and
the violator refused to pay. For a discussion of the importance of § 2462's application to the
administrative stage to the outcome in Meyer, see supra text accompanying notes 121-23, 139-40.
206. 808 F.2d at 920. In fact, Congress supported this interpretation and criticized the Core
Labs. result when it amended the Export Administration Act:
[S]ome confusion has arisen concerning the time limits for initiating administrative actions
and on bringing action in Federal court to collect civil penalties.
The intent of the committee of conference is that the Commerce Department must bring
its administrative case within 5 years from the date the violation occurred. Thereafter, if it
is necessary for the Government to seek to enforce collection of the civil penalty, the complaint must be filed in Federal court within 5 years from the date the penalty was due, but
not paid. Any other interpretation would have the Commerce Department discover, investigate, prosecute, and file a complaint in U.S. District Court to collect the penalty imposed,
but not paid, in the administrative proceeding all within 5 years from the date of the violation. In many instances ... such a task would be impossible.
H.R. REP. No. 180, 99th Cong., 1st. Sess. 64 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 108, 126.
207. United States v. McCune, 763 F. Supp. 916, 918 (S.D. Ohio 1989) (holding "[a] claim to '
collect an administratively imposed civil penalty cannot accrue until the penalty is administratively imposed"); United States v. N.O.C., Inc., 28 Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1460, 1467-68
(D.N.J. Oct. 14, 1988).
208. 537 F. Supp. 1080 (N.D. W. Va. 1982).
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The plain language of section 2462 and precedent fail to support this
approach, however. 209 The Fifth Circuit in Core Laboratories specifically considered and rejected this tactic, citing the lack of precedent
and the fact that tolling is an equitable doctrine which is inappropriate
absent dilatory tactics by the defendant. 210 Moreover, for large penalties, EPA may want to give the violator some time to gather the funds
prior to bringing an action to recover the penalty. If a major portion
of the five years expired prior to EPA's discovery of the violation,
EPA would lose this flexibility. Finally, the Agency has no incentive
to delay bringing an action in district court to collect penalties from
solvent companies who simply refuse to pay. Thus, the defendant does
not need further protection, and the statute should run from the final
penalty assessment.
CONCLUSION

When enacting TSCA, Congress provided no indication as to
whether it intended section 2462's five-year limitation period to apply
to EPA's assessment of penalties. Nor did a much earlier Congress
clearly state whether section 2462 was meant to bar administrative
penalty actions brought more than five years after the violation. Section 2462's broad waiver of the government's immunity from limitation periods, however, should effectively mute any remnants of the
principle of strict construction which might restrict section 2462 only
to federal court actions. Even utilizing strict construction, the
Agency's administrative assessment of penalties under TSCA must be
included within the purview of section 2462 as a "proceeding for the
enforcement of a penalty," because nearly all of the enforcement activity under TSCA takes place at the administrative level.
A decision that section 2462 does not apply to EPA's assessment
of penalties would be contrary to established precedent and practice
under other environmental statutes. Further, applying section 2462
only to district court actions under TSCA results in effectively no limitations period at all. Commencement of the administrative action,
which must precede the district court action, lies solely within EPA's
control. If the Agency can delay enforcement indefinitely, it can rob
industry of the benefits which section 2462 was designed to provide:
freedom from having to defend claims when evidence no longer exists,
repose, and prevention of an unfair surprise of substantial liability.
Failing to apply section 2462 to EPA's assessment of liability frustrates goals of efficient and effective enforcement ofTSCA. A five-year
209. See supra notes 191-93 and accompanying text. But cf Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc., 834 F.2d 1517, 1523 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that the rule in the Ninth Circuit is that the
statute is tolled during administrative proceedings if they are prerequisites to review in federal
court).
210. United States v. Core Lab., Inc., 759 F.2d 480, 484 (5th Cir. 1985).
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time bar provides BPA with an incentive to inspect, investigate, and
promptly enforce alleged violations of TSCA. In contrast, no statute
of limitations encourages BPA to do nothing and allow liability to accumulate. When evidence becomes stale with time, both parties must
expend more resources to discover evidence and reconstruct events
which occurred many years previously and risk unfair determinations
of liability.
The optimal solution is to apply section 2462 to BPA's administrative enforcement of penalties from the date of the violation's occurrence to curb potential agency abuse and delay and to protect
defendants from having to defend stale claims. Similarly, a determination that the district court action does not accrue until BPA's assessment becomes final ensures that BPA will have ample time to discover
a violation, assess liability, and collect a penalty it has assessed.

